

INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSATLANTIC
IMAGES OF BELONGING:
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
IN THE 21ST CENTURY

☆☆☆

JOHN A. HALL

Design, *Zéro faute*, Outremont

ISBN 2-922249-12-3

Dépôt légal-Bibliothèque nationale du Québec, 2001

Dépôt légal-Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

John Hall is Professor of Sociology at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. He has also taught at the University of Southampton, London School of Economics, and Harvard University. His books include: *Is America Breaking Apart?* (co-authored with Charles Lindholm, Princeton, 1999), *International Order and the Future of World Politics* (co-edited with T.V. Paul, Cambridge, 1999), *The State of the Nation: Ernst Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1998), *International Orders* (Polity, 1996), *Coercion and Consent* (Blackwell, 1995), *The State* (co-authored with John Ikenberry, Minnesota, 1989) and *Liberalism* (Paladin, 1989).

T.V. Paul • Michel Fortmann

☆☆☆

1. ZARTMAN, I. William, « The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation » (1997).
2. LEBOW, Richard Ned, « Transitions and Transformations : Building International Cooperation » (1997).
3. BUNCE, Valerie, « The collapse of Socialism, the Soviet Bloc and Socialist States : An Institutionnal Account » (1998).
4. ROUSSEL, Stéphane, GERVAIS, Myriam et Ronald HATTO, « Chronologie de la réaction du Canada face aux conflits intra-étatiques vol. 1 : l'ex-Yougoslavie » (1998).
5. ROUSSEL, Stéphane, GERVAIS, Myriam et Ronald HATTO, « Chronologie de la réaction du Canada face aux conflits intra-étatiques vol. 2 : l'Afrique des Grands Lacs (Rwanda et Est-Zaire) » (1998).
6. GAGNON, Rémy, « Les théories de l'émancipation et l'étude de la sécurité internationale : entre le rationalisme et le réflexivisme » (1999).
7. TESSIER, Manon, « Guide pratique de la recherche sur le maintien de la paix sur Internet » (2000).
8. JOLICŒUR, Pierre, « L'identité civilisationnelle : un concept utile pour l'analyse des conflits caucasiens ? » (2000).
9. KUBÁLKOVÁ, Vendulka, « The tale of two constructivisms at the cold war's end » (2001).
10. PAUL, T.V. « States, Security Function and the New Global Forces » (2001).
11. KRAUSE, Keith, « Norm-Building in Security Spaces: The Emergence of the Light Weapons Problematic » (2001).
12. Lynn-Jones, Sean M., « Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future » (2001).

INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSATLANTIC
IMAGES OF BELONGING:
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
IN THE 21ST CENTURY

JOHN A. HALL

This topic was suggested to me by a fellow academic. Other-directedness has normally appealed to me in intellectual affairs, for it has encouraged thought on subjects otherwise not on my agenda. But I am uncomfortable on this occasion. Explaining why I feel as if I have been offered what chess players' refer to as a poisoned pawn allows immediate highlighting of the argument to be made.

This research area seems to rest on a particular set of assumptions. Belonging needs to be reimagined because the world has changed. The nation-state is being hollowed out by global forces, making traditional national identities less and less adequate. That one response to such globalization has been the creation of narrow and vicious nationalisms lends to the task of reimagining considerable moral urgency. There is a good deal of sense to this implicit sociology, so reminiscent of Benjamin Barber's contrast between Jihad and McWorld (Barber, 1996)—although vicious nationalism has perhaps been the norm rather than the exception within European history. In these circumstances, it makes obvious sense to

think about transatlantic images of belonging. Vast movements of people and capital, membership of international regimes and the legacies of a single civilisation almost dictate thinking about identities other than the national. As I was born in England but have lived for many years in the United States and Canada, it might seem that I exemplify my subject. So I have been offered the seemingly seductive proposal of doing sociology by talking about myself—for I am the evidence of what they seek to establish.

I have neither a reckless desire to bite the hand that feeds me nor any wish to deny novelties to contemporary social conditions, but nonetheless kick against these pricks. More is involved than distaste for talking about myself. Basic mapping of the terrain to do with transatlantic images of belonging suggests considerations that run counter to the assumptions identified. Much depends upon drawing a distinction between two senses of transatlantic belonging: on the one side is membership in a transatlantic political entity, whether formal or informal, whilst on the other is a sense of belonging to a society other than that of the nation-state in which one resides. The first two parts of this paper offer some consideration of these two topics, evidence being drawn—regrettably—from North rather than from South America. Concluding comments offer more general reflections on global processes, the putative decline of the nation-state and the position of the United States within the world's political economy.

Two conceptual points should be borne in mind. First, particular attention is paid to a broad range of social identities. The vast majority of social interaction in the historical record has been *local*; the creation of *national* patterns of interaction is accordingly quintessentially modern. Where national identity is passive, *nationalist* identity is active—especially because it has ideas about the proper conduct of geopolitics. The determination to establish that the nation has its proper 'place in the sun' can and has led to conflict with those with *internationalist* identities. In late nineteenth century Europe, nationalists sought to control and cage foreign-policy making elites whose behavior was held to be altogether too internationally responsible. Finally, international interaction and identity is, although this is not always appreciated, different from the truly *transnational* (Mann, 1993). Second, a warning is in order about the celebrated notion of social construction. Everything in social life, and not just nationalism, is socially constructed. But to

leave matters at this point can lead to licentious voluntarism, that is, to the implicit belief that anything can be constructed at any time. Nothing could be further from the truth: social structures limit and select ideological innovation. Attention here will certainly be given to structural as much as to ideological forces.

Membership in Transatlantic Entities

The broad claim to be defended here is simple: membership within transatlantic political entities has declined quite markedly in the modern world. Let us consider formal transatlantic entities to begin with, in general terms and by means of a single example, and then turn to more recent, novel informal arrangements. The latter have considerable importance but they need to be characterized properly.

Historians now pay much attention to the Atlantic society and economy of the early eighteenth century (e.g., Langley, 1996). The first British empire was, unlike its later successor, very profitable, and the same was true for the early years of French and Spanish transatlantic structures of domination. The British case is especially interesting in the key matter that concerns us. The inhabitants of the Colonies were distinctively British. One way in which this can be seen in the cultural patterning of the United States. Bernard Bailyn has demonstrated ideological continuity, whilst David Hackett Fischer's monumental work shows the re-creation in the New World of very varied social patterns, from architecture and familial life to political attitudes and leadership styles (Bailyn, 1968; Fischer, 1989). More importantly, rebellion occurred in large part because of colonial loyalty to the ideals of the homeland. The move from being the best Englishmen to becoming Americans took place as the result of the conflict; it was consequence not cause. The destruction of the Spanish and British transatlantic empires is generally best explained in terms of the limit to the logistics of rule imposed by geography and composite construction—although accidents (Britain fought without allies, Spain was debilitated by Napoleon) played some part. But the precise cause does not matter here. The analytic point is that belonging became national, nationalist and international rather than transatlantic. Bluntly, this must be true: without this development, the novels of Henry James—to take an obvious example—would simply not make sense.

This point can be made with more force and sophistication by considering the very recent history of Canada, certainly from Confederation in 1867 to the First World War and perhaps even to the 1960s. Here was a country with a state but without a national identity of its own. This is not for a moment to say that there was no sense of identity present within Canada. If Québécois identity was in large part inward looking, the same is not true for what is now known as the Rest of Canada. Here identity had a predominantly transatlantic character, as firmly as was the case for the members of the American colonies in the early eighteenth century. The proof of loyalty was of course paid in blood, in the Boer War and still more so in two world wars. Three points are worth making here about the working of this transatlantic entity (Cannadine, 1997). First, the economic development of Canada, the shipping lines and the railways, depended upon capital provided by London. More than 70% of the 500 million pounds sterling absorbed between 1900 and 1914 came from Britain. Second, Canada provided job opportunities for the highest level of the metropolitan aristocracy. One Governor-General, Lord Lorne, was Queen Victoria's son-in-law. Another, the Duke of Connaught, was her favourite son. Third, the imperial connection allowed for quite remarkable social mobility for colonials within the metropolis. Two examples make this point. Let us consider first Donald Alexander Smith, who arrived in Canada, a penniless Scot in 1838. For twenty-six years he worked in the Hudson's Bay Company. He then moved to Montreal, and became a major figure in the Canadian Pacific Railway and in national politics. In 1895, when already long past seventy, he became the official representative of Canada in London, where he died in 1914—to the considerable irritation of Sir Frederick Borden, the famous Minister of Militia and Defence, who had sought to succeed him (Miller, 1997). Smith piled up colossal wealth, was ennobled as Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal and lived in great state on both sides of the Atlantic. He was Chancellor of McGill University; he equipped at his own cost a troop of horses during the Boer War; he presided in London at an annual banquet each July 1st to celebrate Canadian Confederation; and he spent 40,000 pounds sterling to celebrate his Lord Rectorship of Aberdeen University. A second case is that of William Maxwell Aitken. Within a decade of his arrival in Britain, Aitken was a member of parliament,

a baronet, a peer, the owner of Express newspapers and the friend and confidant of that other son of the Canadian manse, Andrew Bonar Law—who became Prime Minister (in contrast to Aitken himself whose highest political post was that of Minister of Aircraft Production in 1940). The causes to which Aitken was attracted—Empire Free Trade in the 1930's and opposition to entry in the Common Market, together with deep antipathy to Lord Mountbatten on the grounds that he gave away India, the jewel of the empire as a whole—were characteristic of this transatlantic world. Bluntly, he loved the British empire more than did the British themselves.

It would be easy to go on, and at length, describing mechanisms of connection or recounting biographical details. Further, the historic pattern has scarcely completely ended. An old joke about Pierre Trudeau had it that the history of Canada would have been very different had he taken his theory of nationalism from Ernest Gellner rather than from Elie Kedourie whilst he was a student at the London School of Economics. Equally, such contemporary public intellectuals as Michael Ignatieff and James Tully gained much of their intellectual capital at the University of Cambridge. Still, the analytic point to be made remains the same as for the first British and the Spanish Atlantic empires. This transatlantic entity has by and large come to an end. There is at least a Canadian national anthem (or, rather, two of them), the constitution has (at last for every province except Quebec) been repatriated, and it would not surprise me were a republican movement to arise in the future to echo the one that is now making inroads in Australia. Perhaps the general point is best made with reference to two contemporary figures. James Tully—a distinguished figure and friend—is not a Briton who happens to be living in Canada. Whilst he doubtless has multiple identities, it looks as if his strongest desire to create a new, sophisticated, open and tolerant Canadian national identity; in the final analysis his identify is not transatlantic, but international, national and occasionally nationalist. Conrad Black, the owner of Britain's *The Daily Telegraph*, illuminates matters by sheer contrast. His status as Aitken's presumptive heir seemed assured in 1999 when the British government offered him a peerage. But the Canadian government (whose Prime Minister has reason to dislike the newspaper tycoon) refused to allow him, as a Canadian citizen,

to accept this honour. National identity has trumped this transatlantic political entity.

Let me turn to informal transatlantic identities. It may be useful to begin with to say that such identities most certainly have made an impact on the historical record. International relations scholars like to point to the transfer of power between Britain and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century as perhaps the sole example of a peaceful hegemonic transition within the history of the world polity. This transition was certainly eased by geography, but it depended upon shared liberal norms (Doyle, 1983)—and perhaps still more on shared Anglo-Saxon habit (Mann, 1993). Kipling lived in Vermont for a long period, knew Mahan and Teddy Roosevelt, and eventually felt as at home with the key figures in Great Britain's military apparatus, Lords Fisher and Esher. This background transatlantic identity most certainly did a great deal to allow for the creation of a strategy to counter Imperial Germany. A division of military labor meant in particular that Britain could concentrate on designing plans to bottle up the German fleet so as to starve the German population into submission (Offer, 1989).

Is there any more recent equivalent to this situation? The least that can be said about the Atlantic Community was that an attempt was made to create an extensive transatlantic identity (Cf. Schaeper and Schaeper, 1998). All those CIA funded Congresses for Cultural Freedom sought to cement a shared identity, an enterprise in a sense personified in the vigorous figure of Edward Shils—resident for most of his life half a year in Chicago and half a year at the University of Cambridge. Still, how extensive and deep was this identity? It is worth keeping at the centre of one's mind that identities habitually involve some sort of mix between interest and affect. Is emotional attachment as strong in the Atlantic Community as it was amongst Anglo-Saxons at the turn of the century? Let us consider the most powerful transatlantic link—the 'Special Relationship' between the United States and Great Britain—before characterizing the nature of the Atlantic community as a whole.

The Special Relationship has received enormous attention, not surprisingly since it is with us still. One of the earliest architects was Winston Churchill. The fact that his mother was American lends authenticity to the notion of a transatlantic identity. Still, his

behavior as First Lord of the Admiralty and as Prime Minister had quite as much at its core the pragmatic desire to extend *British* power by means of the American connection. Calculation seems stronger still in Harold Macmillan's celebrated words to Richard Crossman while attached to Eisenhower's headquarters in Algiers in 1942: '[We] are the Greeks in this American empire. You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans—great big, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run [this HQ] as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius' (Horne, 1988, p. 160). This same vein was struck by Keynes, when commenting to his staff before beginning meetings about the British loan 'they may have all the money, but we've got all the brains'.¹

If we now revert to continental European cases, the air of calculation rather than of shared identity comes to the fore. As an intellectual, Raymond Aron, despite his fabulous intelligence and carefully nurtured American relationships, was first and foremost French. In more political terms, the 'empire by invitation' that is NATO resulted from the famous calculation, coined by Lord Ismay, that it was necessary 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and Germany down' (Lundestad, 1986). A similar point must be made about the nature of transatlantic relations in general, to whose characterisation we can now turn.

Nationalist geopolitics in the period from 1870-1945 produced, as noted, genuine anarchy in the international system. In these conditions, it made sense to grab territory; nationalism became inextricably linked with imperialism for only extensive territory could secure supplies and markets. The resolution of Europe's security dilemma after 1945 broke this connection. A very particular transatlantic society was created. There are now frequent

1. I heard this story from James Meade. Though I have learnt a great deal from K. Phillip's *The Cousins's Wars* (1999), the thesis of that book—that there is a united Anglo-America—does not convince this British subject for a simple reason, namely that there have been many occasions when the United States has chosen to act alone. This was true of the shaping of the postwar architecture of the international economy with which Keynes was involved. Equally, Mrs Thatcher was apparently only told about the bombing raid on Libya when American planes were airborne.

meetings of the leaders of the Atlantic states, but key transatlantic (and international) institutions are dominated in the last resort by the leading power. This is obviously true of NATO whose commanding officer is, has been, and it is safe to say always will be an American. Europeans have realized that the United States has solved their security dilemma, have occasionally shared anti-communist attitudes, and are well aware that the benefit of being geopolitically supine is their considerable affluence. Nonetheless, the fact that interest in international cooperation is not any automatic or unquestioning transatlantic identity can be seen in endless quibbles and in pervasive anti-Americanism. Still, the pretense is that of community, and so it hurts—especially in London—when the United States acts unilaterally, as it does whenever anything of consequence to its own interests is at stake.

The most striking recent portrait of American-European relations, that of Steve Walt's 'The Ties that Fray' (1998/9), suggests that interests have now diverged to such an extent as to destroy any continuing sense of community. It is certainly true that trade between America and Europe is not great (with the United States alone having the option of isolationism), and that economic interests, both in agriculture and in communicative technologies, diverge sharply. All of this will lead, and in the eyes of commentators in addition to Walt, to an economic challenge spearheaded by the new Euro. Further, Europeans calculate the threats in the Middle and Near East in a manner all their own, and clearly resent being subject to American meddling—with the same applying with still greater force in cultural affairs. Despite the cogency of these points, Walt seems to me to be quite wrong. Given that calculation rather than community ruled in the first instance, there is more evidence of continuity than he allows. There is no sign of any real challenge to the United States, much as I might like it, and a good deal to suggest the exact opposite. Who would have predicted, for example, that France would effectively rejoin NATO—a move calculated to balance united Germany by strengthening the American involvement? Does anybody really think it likely that Europe's status as economic giant and military worm will change? Has not the timing of actions in the erstwhile Yugoslavia been dependent, for better and for worse, upon what happens in Washington? And is it really likely that the Euro, which of course at this moment seems so weak, can

triumph over the dollar, when the United States remains the provider of geopolitical security?

It is worth trying to highlight the central contention made to this point. Transatlantic political entities are weaker than they once were. On the one hand, formal political entities have disappeared. On the other hand, the large element of calculation in transatlantic relations means that the taken-for-granted quality inherent in the very notion of identity is somewhat lacking.² Still, this diminished condition looks, in the absence of any alternative, rather durable. But this is a first approximation; more will be said about the United States.

Belongings Beyond One's Nation-State

A proper investigation of images of belonging to social worlds outside one's own state or nation-state would of course be vast. An enormous amount could be said about the images of the other held by people, differentially divided by class, religion and ethnicity, on different sides of the Atlantic. Much here has little to do with belonging. Still less prominent is accuracy of perception. It is difficult for me to describe the loathing that I feel for much BBC drama, so often featuring effete members of the aristocracy, produced for American consumption. This makes a good deal of money, and justifies American views of the backwardness of Britain—but at the expense of any sense of what actually happens in that country. Other images do have much more to do with a sense of belonging, not least amongst American intellectuals—names could be given—who dream of the Café Flore. However, rather than concentrate on such images let me, so to speak, raise the bar higher so as to ask not just about dreams but instead about what might be called networks of interaction—by which is meant those belongings that affect actions rather than dreams.

There is of course nothing novel about the presence of networks of interaction that transcend borders. In medieval Europe, the larger identities of feudalism and of Christianity for centuries transcended states; similar points can be made about most of the

2. It may be sensible to emphasise that pure affective identity can and does matter in contemporary Europe. The most obvious example is the desire of many citizens in Central Europe to 'rejoin Europe'.

world religions, whilst intellectuals quite often have more allegiance to their fellows than to the state in which they live. Still, the standard generalisation of historical sociology has been that the rise of the nation-state has increasingly caged social interactions within its borders. This has overwhelmingly been true of the means of violence: there have been few Wallensteins since the seventeenth century, although it is true that the career of Juan Peron cannot be understood without knowledge of his period of residence in fascist Europe. In the period between 1870 and, say, 1958, capitalists were similarly caged, although I will argue later that their later release is not as great as is often imagined—and that, at least in Europe, it results less from the defeat of the state than from deliberate state design. Whilst bearing these points in mind, let us concentrate most on peoples. Is it the case that the classical immigrant experience—in which one assimilated, at considerable cost, to the host national culture—has come to an end? Are diasporas now so well connected by cheap travel and the internet that homogeneous national entities can no longer be created? This brings us to key theoretical debates. Bluntly, how much of the ideas of postnationalist and of multiculturalism should we accept?

There most certainly are cases where the extensive search of a diaspora matters for very practical reasons, as most obviously was and is true for the overseas Chinese—many of whom live in genuinely multicultural settings. Is there any transatlantic equivalent? Let us consider Europe and the United States in turn.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States was the stuff of which dreams were made of, both for peasants in Central and Southern Europe and for the persecuted from regions further to the East. Histories of immigration show that there was much more movement back and forward than we now realise, with perhaps fifty per cent of Italians who came to the United States returning when economic conditions proved too adverse. This is evidence of an extensive network before the era of modern communications, although it is far from sure that this amounted to a genuine transatlantic identity. Irish immigration to the United States in the last thirty years has had a similar character. But the blunt fact is that Europe no longer provides the bulk of immigrants to the United States. American racism of course closed off southern and eastern Europe in 1924. More importantly, most of

the nation-states of Europe have made themselves attractive places in which to live, with industrialisation now capable of absorbing populations once forced to migrate. Tourism to the United States from across the Atlantic booms, but a transatlantic identity based in Europe does not seem on the cards.

There certainly are cases in North America where an image of transatlantic belonging matters. Capital, the human capital of the young trained in computer technology, and political leadership has come, with varying degrees of benefit, to the Baltics and to the Balkans from the United States. But we need to be very careful before saying that transatlantic belongings are generally strong and on the increase. Three considerations should be borne in mind. First, what is at issue at times is longing rather than belonging: it seems to me to be the case that the Québécois often feel rejected and jilted by the French, who rarely go to live there—often preferring to make jokes about their accent. Secondly, it is very important to note that the images of belonging are imaginary, and that the process of imagining distinctively reflects American culture rather than any primordial identity. The spaghetti with meatballs that marks Italian-American culture is unknown in Italy; more importantly, the support given by Irish-Americans to NORAD was quite often an extreme embarrassment to Irish citizens, amongst them the members of the rock band U2—who famously and very bravely criticized their ‘fellows’ in this regard. Third, transatlantic identities are simply not present at all in key circumstances. Recent years have seen the emergence of non-ethnic white Americans, present in striking numbers in the mid-West, who no longer make any pretense at having a transatlantic identity. More controversially, it is worth pointing out the huge difference that exists between African-Americans and Afro-Americans. Except for some very striking exceptions, it is by and large true to say that Afro-Americans have no particular loyalty or link to Africa. There is a vast body of evidence showing that Afro-Americans share mainstream American values, and wish for nothing more than to be full members of their own society—making it all the more cruel, of course, that they cannot gain proper entry into mainstream American society.

It is well worth while pausing to consider the United States in a little more detail, not least as this society, the largest and most

powerful in the transatlantic world, is the source of recent claims about multiculturalism and postnationality. The central point to be made is that diversity was once much greater in the United States than it is today. Two points should be borne in mind. On the one hand, the United States in 1920 boasted 276 newspapers in German, 118 in Spanish or Portuguese, 111 in Scandinavian languages, 98 in Italian, 76 in Polish, 51 in Czech or Slovak, 46 in French, 42 in Slovenian and 39 in Yiddish—together with the genuinely different culture of the Solid South (Lind, 1995, p. 75). All of this has of course gone. On the other hand, brilliant research by Mary Waters has demonstrated both that ethnicity is no longer a cage but rather an option—and one, it should be noted, that has astonishingly little actual substance (Waters, 1990). This latter point is not to say for a moment that the constructed identity is not somehow real and important: very much to the contrary, to have an ethnic identity is now almost a constitutional right. But the point about the politics of difference is that so many people are demanding recognition: that so many ask for the same thing is an astonishing demonstration of the continuing powers of American nationalising homogeneity—for all but Afro-Americans (Hall and Lindholm, 1999). Furthermore, difference is entertained only so far as it is, so to speak, toilet-trained and American: it is fine to express one's Asian background by wearing a Sari when graduating from high school—but only on the condition that one does not take caste seriously. As this is view is contentious, not to say unpopular, it is worth justifying. Consider that research on Hispanics shows that they are no different from previous immigrants: Cuban-Americans in Florida have out-marriage rates of above 50% within a single generation, together with a set of attitudes in tune with those of the larger society.³ Perhaps this should not surprise us. It remains the case that immigrants are attracted to the United States because of the opportunities for social mobility that an ever more powerful and nationally integrated capitalist culture offers. If that is to say that the immigrants who come to the United States are self-selected in such a way as to reinforce core American beliefs, there should be no gainsaying of the other side of the picture. Apparently a

3. This figure is drawn from the unpublished research of Elizabeth Arias, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

stump speech directed against Ann Richards when running to be Governor of Texas had it that 'if English is good enough for Jesus Christ, it is good enough for Texas'. Poll evidence shows very, very high levels of opposition in the United States for any general recognition of a second official language; the votes against such recognition in California are thus entirely representative of strong external pressures placed on immigrants (Wolfe, 1998). All of this can be summarised in the starkest possible terms: no real transatlantic identity will develop from the United States, which will remain a great engine for creating Americans.

Conclusion: the Globe, the Nation-State and the United States

This paper began by noting the prominence of a general sociological view in which the nation-state seen is held to have been hollowed out both from above and from below. It may be useful to end by making some general points about this, not least as hints have been given of my own considerable scepticism to this position. Some cursory comments about the globe, the nation-state and the United States may be enough to give cause for thought.

We should not all be globalisers now for a whole set of reasons (Hall, 2000). First, trading patterns go against any naive view of the globe as the key economic unit (Wade, 1996). World trade has only just regained the level of 1913, with most of the increase since 1945 anyway being due most of all to the removal of tariffs within Europe. Further, between 1970 and 1990 the share of the North within world trade increased from 81-84%; importantly, the United States trades only 12% of its GDP—with only 3% of its GDP being involved with the developing world. Second, foreign direct investment patterns show both that external investments—anyway small as a proportion of home capital—go very largely to the North rather than to the South. Third, the most striking research on firms suggests that we should speak of NFIO's rather than TNCs or MNCs, that is, of national firms with international operations rather than transnational or multinational corporations. Profits are still repatriated to the home base, with management reflecting national ownership more and more strongly as one mounts the corporate ladder. Fourth, technological innovation, measured by research and development spending and the taking of patents,

continues to reflect the historical differences of nation-states. Fifth, restrictions on labor, to some extent in the United States but much more so in Europe, look set to increase, whilst those of Japan do not look as if they are about to diminish: it is this evidence that makes me doubt the case for post-nationalism. To be set against all this, of course, is the undoubted speed with which money now flows around the world. But here too reservations are in order: stock markets remain very largely national, whilst the floating of currencies reflects the interests of the United States quite as much as any global logic of its own.

We should be equally cautious when assessing the powers of the nation-state. States within capitalism have rarely had and have rarely sought total control over their destinies. Historical awareness makes one realise that states are very adaptable, with the loss of power in one arena often being compensated for by an increase elsewhere—as is the case now, for the penetrative power of the state is increasing for all that some monetary powers are being abandoned. Are European states less powerful now that they have been humbled by the attempts made between 1870 and 1945 to become total power containers? Is not less more? Exactly how many states are really challenged seriously from below? Were not the great secessionist drives of the last years directed only against the last great empire, that of the Soviet Union? Serious analysis makes one realise that the European Union has depended at all times on the motor of the Franco-German alliance—something which goes some way to suggesting that the future of the Union is likely to remain international rather than transnational (Milward, 1992). If the nation-state is still present in Europe, where one can at least argue about new forces, there is little likelihood of it suddenly collapsing in the United States or Japan. The only place where states are collapsing is in sub-Saharan Africa. Awareness of this should make us realise how provincial is much Western commentary when speaking about the state: much of the world needs the powers of the state to increase.

The final general point can be made quickly for it is implicit in much of what has been said already. A measure of order in the world comes from the re-creation of international society. But behind that remains the huge powers of the most powerful state the world has yet seen. In retrospect we can see (what in fact could be seen

at the time) that the debate about American decline was utterly misconceived. Only the United States has military, cultural, monetary, economic and ideological force of primary weight in the contemporary world. One sign of the supremacy of the United States is the simple fact that it has the ability to run a continual trading imbalance with the rest of the world. The current account of the United States is balanced by borrowing most of the excess capital of the world economy. Such capital is available, it has been argued (Wade and Veneroso, 1998), because of the American insistence on the opening of financial markets—an opening, it should be noted, that helped to cause and certainly to exacerbate the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. This suggests a final thought. The inhabitants of the Beltway do not really possess any transatlantic identity, thereby making traditional realist concepts all-too-relevant. But the fact that much of the motion of modernity is now determined, for better or worse, in Washington means that it behooves Europeans to have a transatlantic awareness (and much of the rest of the world to have international awareness)—even though they lack much sense of transatlantic belonging.

References

- Bailyn, Bernard. 1968. *The Origins of American Politics*, New York, Vintage.
- Barber, Benjamin. 1996. *Jihad vs McWorld*, New York, Ballantine.
- Cannadine, David. 1997. 'Imperial Canada: Old History, New Problems', in C. Coates, ed., *Imperial Canada, 1867-1917*, Edinburgh, Centre for Canadian Studies.
- Doyle, Michale. 1983. 'Kant. Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, 3 and 4 (June and October), pp. 205-35 and 323-53.
- Fischer, David Hackett. 1989. *Albion's Seed*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Hall, John A. 2000. 'Nationalism and Globalization', *Thesis 11*, no. 63, pp.
- Hall, John A. and Charles Lindholm, 1999. *Is America Breaking Apart?*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Horne, Alastair. 1988, *Harold MacMillan. Volume One: 1894-1956*, New York, Viking.
- Langley, David . 1996, *The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750-1850*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

- Lundestad, Geir. 1986. 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945- 1952', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 263-77..
- Mann, Michael 1993. *The Sources of Social Power. Volume Two: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, Carman 1997. 'Sir Frederick goes to London: Money, Militia and Gentlemanly Capitalists', in C. Coates, ed., *Imperial Canada, 1867-1917*, Edinburgh: Centre for Canadian Studies.
- Milward, Alan 1992. *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Offer, Avner 1989. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Phillips, Kevin 1999. *The Cousins' s Wars: Religion, Politics and the Triumph of Anglo- America*, New York, Basic Books.
- Schaeper, Thomas and Schaeper, Kathleen 1998. *Cowboys and Gentlemen: Rhodes Scholars, Oxford and the Creation of an American Elite*, Leamington Spa, Berg.
- Wade, Robert 1996. 'Globalization and Its Limits: Reports on the Death of the National Economy are Greatly Exaggerated', in S. Berger and R. Dore, eds., *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 60-88.
- Wade, Robert and Frank Veneroso. 1998. 'The Gathering World Slump and the Battle over Capital Controls', *New Left Review*, no. 231, pp. 13-42.
- Walt, Steven. 1998/9. 'The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart'', *The National Interest*, no. 54, pp. 3-11.
- Waters, Mary. 1990. *Ethnic Options*, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Wolfe, Alan. 1998. *One Nation, After All*, New York, Viking.

Content

| | |
|--|----|
| Membership in Transatlantic Entities | 7 |
| Belongings Beyond One's Nation-State | 13 |
| Conclusion: the Globe, the Nation-State and the United States | 17 |
| References | 19 |