When (and How) Regions Become Peaceful: Explaining Transitions From War to Peace

☆ ☆ ☆

Benjamin Miller

Design, *Zéro faute*, Outremont

Benjamin Miller received a Master's Degree in Political Science from the Hebrew University, and completed his Doctoral studies at the University of California at Berkeley in 1988. He has been teaching at Jerusalem since 1989, and has served as a research fellow at Harvard and MIT and as a visiting researcher at Princeton. Dr. Miller's areas of expertise include the theory of international relations and national security, especially conflict and international cooperation. His current research focuses on the causes of war and of regional peace. Among his publications is *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Notes de recherche du GERSI/REGIS Working Papers
Collection dirigée par/Series Editors

T.V. Paul • Michel Fortmann

☆ ☆ ☆

1. Zartman, I. William, « The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation » (1997).
2. Lebow, Richard Ned, « Transitions and Transformations : Building International Cooperation » (1997).
3. Bunce, Valerie, « The collapse of Socialism, the Soviet Bloc and Socialist States : An Institutionnal Account » (1998).
4. Roussel, Stéphane, Gervais, Myriam et Ronald Hatto, « Chronologie de la réaction du Canada face aux conflits intra-étatiques vol. 1 : l'ex-Yougoslavie » (1998).
5. Roussel, Stéphane, Gervais, Myriam et Ronald Hatto, « Chronologie de la réaction du Canada face aux conflits intra-étatiques vol. 2 : l'Afrique des Grands Lacs (Rwanda et Est-Zaïre)» (1998).
6. Gagnon, Rémy, « Les théories de l'émancipation et l'étude de la sécurité internationale : entre le rationalisme et le réflexivisme » (1999).
7. Tessier, Manon, « Guide pratique de la recherche sur le maintien de la paix sur Internet » (2000).
8. Jolicœur, Pierre, « L'identité civilisationnelle : un concept utile pour l'analyse des conflits caucasiens ? » (2000).
9. Kubálková, Vendulka, « The tale of two constructivisms at the cold war's end » (2001).
10. Paul, T.V. « States, Security Function and the New Global Forces » (2001).
11. Krause, Keith, « Norm-Building in Security Spaces: The Emergence of the Light Weapons Problematic » (2001).
12. Lynn-Jones, Sean M., « Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future » (2001).
13. Hall, John A., « International and Transatlantic Images of Belonging: The United States and Europe in the 21st Century» (2001)

WHEN (AND HOW) REGIONS BECOME PEACEFUL: EXPLAINING TRANSITIONS FROM WAR TO PEACE

BENJAMIN MILLER

Introduction

Three important regions have moved from war to peace during the 20th century: South America in the beginning of the century, Western Europe in the middle while the Middle East has begun the move toward the end of the century. Not only did these moves take place in different periods in this century, but they also resulted in completely different types and levels of peace. How can we best explain these transitions and variations?

Western Europe moved from a major war-zone to a zone of peace in the years following World War II. South America started the move to regional peace, even if not perfectly, much earlier in the 20th century. However, since the late 1950s Western Europe has reached a much higher level of peace than South America. A vigorous peace process began in the Middle East, in contrast, only in the early 1990s and the peace there is still much more fragile than in the other regions.

The objective of this study is to address the following two puzzles: what best accounts for the transition from war to peace in different regions in different times? And what is the best explanation of variations in the level of peace which exists in different regions in a certain period of time like the differences which exist today in the level of peace among the Middle East, South America and Western Europe?

With the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing interest in the question of regional war and peace but war, and as a result peace, have always been a neighborhood problem.[1] Thus, regional peace is a prerequisite for global peace.[2] Despite the commonly separate treatment in the literature of causes of war and sources of peace, we can not understand transitions from war to peace without knowing the sources of regional wars and then how different peace strategies address them. My argument is that the underlying cause of regional war-propensity is the state-to-nation balance in a certain region. Accordingly, different peacemaking strategies, derived from different theoretical approaches, produce different levels of peace based on their distinctive treatment of the regional manifestations of the state-to-nation problem, notably, territorial and boundary questions.

Yet, the state-to-nation balance in the region conditions the effectiveness of the different peacemaking strategies. When there is a state-to-nation imbalance, strategies which focus on changing the capabilities of the local antagonists can be the most effective. In regional context, it means those strategies related to the type of involvement of the great powers, especially hegemony or cooperation, but not competition or disengagement. However, when there is a relatively high extent of state-to-nation balance, peacemaking strategies, which focus on changing the intentions of the regional parties, can be effective. Most notably, there are two types of such regional strategies: conflict resolution and integration.

I make a distinction between the *effects* of approaches to peacemaking and the *conditions* for their success. Different peacemaking strategies may bring about the transition from war to peace, but each strategy will be successful only if certain distinctive conditions

---

1. Vasquez (1995); and citations in Miller (1998a), p. 2, fns. 4-6.
2. Kupchan (1998), p. 45 citing also Nye (1971).

exist in the region. Moreover, different peacemaking strategies bring about different levels of peace. Thus, even if different strategies may be successful, there will still be dramatic differences in the level of regional peace which they will produce and, thus, in the likelihood of a return to a state of war. The effects of all the strategies are regional, but the conditions for their effectiveness vary considerably and come from three levels of analysis: the global— the presence of a great power hegemon or concert (for the strategy of great power engagement), regional/domestic—the presence of strong and coherent states (for the strategy of conflict resolution), and domestic—the presence of liberal democracies (for the integration option).

The strategies are derived from three major approaches to international relations: one is globalist/systemic and two are regionalists. The two at the regional level are regional society and regional community. The peacemaking strategy derived from the regional society is conflict resolution, while the strategy of integration is derived from the regional community approach (see figure 1). The third strategy is at the global level: great power engagement. The three strategies are derived from the global-regional debate on the sources of regional war and peace. I will propose a solution to this debate by differentiating among two levels of regional peace (cold and warm), and arguing that whereas the global level can bring about only cold peace, the regional strategies may result in warmer peace, more specifically, the conflict resolution in normal peace, while integration in warm peace. The reason that international strategies can bring only cold peace is related to the context in which it is the most effective strategy—a state-to-nation imbalance. Since the international strategy only moderates the manifestations of this imbalance, but it is unable fully to resolve it, the resulting peace is only a cold one. The strategies, which focus on changing the intentions of the actors, can bring about higher levels of warmer peace, although only in a context of a state-to-nation balance. In such a context, they can either directly resolve the outstanding issues in conflict (the conflict resolution strategy) or transcend them (the integration strategy).

Figure 1

Theoretical Approaches and the peacemaking strategies
derived from them

The Theoretical Approach	The Derived Peacemaking Strategy
Global System	Great Power Regional Engagement
Regional Society	Regional Conflict Resolution
Regional Communit	Regional Integration

Each of the strategies will be successful in bringing about its expected level of peace only under certain specific conditions (see figure 2). In the absence of these conditions, the strategy will fail to generate such a level of peace. The global strategy of great power engagement will result in peace only if a great power hegemon or concert are present vis-a-vis the region in question. In contrast, great power competition will disrupt the ability to produce even a cold peace, while a disengagement from hegemony/concert undermines the cold peace. The conditions for the success of the two regional strategies are distinguished based on the debate on democratization vs. strengthening the state as the prerequisite for generating regional peace and security. Regional conflict resolution can be effective in bringing about normal peace only if the regional states are strong and coherent. Regional integration will be successful in leading to warm peace only if all the regional states are liberal democracies.

The pacifying value as well as the disadvantages of the three mechanisms for regional peace will be investigated by comparative illustrations from four regions, each exemplifying a specific strategy leading to a transition to a certain level of peace based on the presence of certain conditions: the Balkans during the 19th century Concert of Europe (cold peace which collapsed as the great powers moved from cooperation to competition); the post-Cold War Middle East (cold peace emerged following the rise of US hegemony instead of superpower competition); South America during the 20th century (normal peace evolved following the strengthening of the regional states); and post-1945 Western Europe (warm peace caused by the combination of US hegemony and successful liberalization). The proposed theoretical framework will integrate the

Figure 2

Effects and Conditions
The Regional Effects of Peacemaking Strategies
and the Conditions for their Success

Peacemaking Strategy	The Strategy's Effects-The Level of Peace	The Conditions for the Strategy's Effectiveness
Great Power Regional Engagement	Cold Peace	The presence of a great power hegemon or concert vis-a-vis the region in question
Regional Conflict Resolution	Normal Peace	Strong and coherent States
Regional Integration (institutions&common market)	Warm Peace	Liberal democracies

regional and international perspectives on regional peace by establishing linkages between different mechanisms for regional peace and the emergence of different levels of peace.

Yet, there is a trade-off between the regional and the international strategies for advancing regional peace. While the regional/domestic strategies are more desirable than the international one in that they are conducive to higher levels of regional peace, they are less feasible, as problems of nation-to-state are hard to resolve and liberalization depends on demanding prerequisites. In contrast, the international strategy is more feasible (to the extent that the necessary international conditions are present), but this mechanism is unable by itself to go beyond cold peace and produce higher levels of peace. I will argue that the international strategy can bring about only a relatively low level of peace (cold peace). But cold peace can be conducive to a growing effectiveness of the regional/domestic-level strategies of peacemaking, starting from the regional conflict resolution strategy resulting in normal peace. Normal peace, in turn, is conducive to liberalization and as a result to the emergence of the highest degree of peace—warm peace. The framework will provide an analytical tool for evaluating the current and future (short-term and long-term) progress in the Middle East peace process and in peacemaking in the Balkans in comparison with past peace processes in other regions, most notably, Western Europe and South America.

The Theoretical Sources of Transitions to Peace:
System, Society and Community

The question of the sources of regional war and peace is closely related to the debate on the relative influence of international/global versus regional/domestic factors on the evolution of regional conflict and cooperation.[3]

The *international systemic* or "outside-in" logic[4] suggests that it is impossible to understand regional dynamics without focusing on the broader international context within which regional orders are embedded and taking into account the influence of external pressures and incentives working vis-à-vis the region. Indeed, in the modern interconnected world there can be no wholly self-contained regions, immune from outside inputs.

Regional or "inside-out" approaches[5] claim that small states respond in the first place to local factors and developments because this is the most important environment which affects their security interests. The regional environment creates the most direct external threats and opportunities for the local states. The regional argument is that there is a high degree of autonomy of regional dynamics from international factors and to the extent that the global arena exercises influence, it is mediated by attributes of the region such as the degree of intensity of regional disputes and their characteristics. Analysts of regional security must concentrate on conflict patterns and processes unique to specific regions rather than assume that the causes of local conflicts can be attributed to the machinations of Cold War adversaries or ex-colonial powers or to the structure of the international system. Regional systems have their own structures and dynamics, and operate with their own sets of opportunities and constraints. There are two relevant conceptions of regional order: society and community.

---

3. See Vayrynen (1984); Wriggins (1992); Doran (1992); Hurell (1995); Zartman and Kremenyuk, eds., (1995); and Katzenstein (1996). For a useful distinction between "outside-in" and "inside-out" approaches to regional orders, see Neumann (1994).

4. See, most notably, Waltz (1979). For critiques, see Keohane, ed., (1986); Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993); and Lebow and Risse-Kappen, eds., (1995). See also Wayman and Diehl (1994), Brown et al. (1995), and Frankel (1996).

5. Buzan (1991), ch. 5; Ayoob (1995); K. J. Holsti (1996); Job, ed., (1992), chs. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10; David (1991).

Regional society: In a regional society, ideologically diverse states co-exist, interact and cooperate by respecting the norms of mutual sovereignty, the territorial integrity of other states in the region, the sanctity of boundaries, and the principle of non-interference in their neighbors' domestic affairs.[6] Behavior in accordance with these norms ensures durable regional peace.

Regional Community: In contrast to the focus of the regional society-of-states perspective on inter-state relations within a given region, there is a competing liberal image of a regional community which highlights the transnational social bonds that link the individual citizens of regional states.[7] In creating a regional liberal community, this perspective emphasizes the domestic transformation of the regional states to make them ideologically similar, and also the enhancement of transnational relations and transborder communication in the economic, social, and cultural domains. As opposed to a regional society, in a regional liberal community inter-state boundaries are not sacred, and inter-governmental relations are not the only relations that count. Thus, there is a high degree of involvement and engagement in the domestic affairs of the other member-states of the community, and a process of creating powerful supra-national institutions which challenge and diminish the sovereignty of the existing states.

A major difference between these two regional perspectives is that a regional society may emerge regardless of the domestic regimes and ideologies of the regional states. In contrast, a common ideology is a necessary condition for the evolution of a regional community.[8] Yet, mere ideological similarity is insufficient for the creation of a meaningful regional community. Equally important is the

---

6. On these norms in the context of the post-1945 Third World, see Buchheit (1978), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Herbst (1989), Jackson (1990), and Ayoob (1995, ch. 4). On a regional society of states, see also Buzan (1991), Job (1992), Wriggins (1992), Hurell (1995), Holm and Sorensen (1995), Holsti (1996), and Lake and Morgan (1997). For a recent critique of the regional society thesis which focuses on the domestic politics of ethnic ties, see Saidman (1997), pp. 721-53.

7. I partly rely here on Bull's (1977, pp. 25-7) so-called Kantian perspective, applied to the regional instead of the universal level.

8. See the major work of Deutsch et al. (1957) on security communities. They argue that the compatiblity of major values is essential for the emergence of such a community. On this point see also Rock (1989), pp. 3-4.

content of the shared ideology, which should encourage a sense of affinity ("we-feeling") and mutual trust among the regional member-states. Such trust is necessary for giving up part of their sovereignty by creating supra-national institutions and encouraging transna-tional relations. As I argue, the major ideology that fosters such affinity and trust among the states who share it is liberalism, and therefore such ideology is necessary for the emergence of a regio-nal community.[9]

While this debate refers to international vs. regional influences on regional peace in general terms, I will show that the regional/domestic perspective subsumes two different regional strategies or mechanisms for regional peacemaking: regional integration and con-flict resolution and the different domestic conditions on which they depend: democratization and strengthening the state. The debate between these two regional/domestic-level strategies will be discussed in the following sections. From the international per-spective one may deduce that the way to promote regional peace is through great power involvement in the region. But this involve-ment will make the region more peaceful only when the engage-ment is in the form of a concert of powers or the stabilizing hege-mony of a single power. Thus, this study specifies three distinctive (although not mutually exclusive) roads to regional peace based on different conditions.

The Theoretical Framework

Differentiation of the Dependent Variable:
The Level of Regional Peace

One of the ways to compare the three mechanisms for regional peace is with regard to the degree or level of peace they bring about. For this purpose, I will distinguish among three major ideal types or levels of peace: cold peace, normal peace and warm peace. These types constitute three degrees of stability of peace or the level of the regional security system: cold is the least stable and the lowest level, warm is the most stable and the highest level of regional security, and normal is the in-between category. Here I

---

9. This is closely related to the distinction between "unifying" and "divi-sive" ideologies discussed below.

present only a brief version of my three categories.[10] The differences among these types of peace are summed up in table 1.

Cold peace refers to a situation of an absence of both war and threats of recourse to force among the regional states. The underlying issues of the regional conflict are being moderated and reduced, but are still far from being fully resolved. Thus, the danger of a return to the use of force still looms in the background. There may be formal peace agreements among the parties but the relations are conducted mainly at the intergovernmental (rather than the transnational, nongovernmental) level.

Normal peace is a situation in which the likelihood of war is lower than in cold peace because most, if not all, of the substantive issues of the conflict have been resolved. But war is still not completely out of the question. The relations among the states begin to develop beyond the intergovernmental level.

Warm peace is a situation in which regional war is unthinkable in any scenario of international or regional change. Even if some

Figure 3

The Ideal Types of Regional Peace

	Cold Peace	Normal Peace	Warm Peace
main issues in conflict	mitigated, but not fully resolved	resolved	resolved or transcended (rendered irrelevant)
presence of significant revisionist groups	present	possible	absent
contingency plans for war	still present	likely in case of a rise to power of revisionist elites	absent
possibility of return to war	in case of international or domestic changes	in case of domestic changes	unthinkable in case of any changes

---

10. For extended presentations and references, see Miller (2000a, 2000b, forthcoming). There is also no need to do here a comparison with other typologies of peace because such a comparison is forthcoming in Bar-Siman-Tov et al. On negative, positive, and stable peace, see Galtung (1975) and Boulding (1978). On regional security, see Buzan (1991).

issues are in dispute among the regional states, the use of force is completely out of the question as an option for addressing them. This type of peace is characterized by extensive transnational relations and a high degree of regional interdependence.

The State-to-Nation Imbalance as the Underlying Cause of Regional War-Propensity

In order to go to war, regional states need both motivation and capabilities to do so. The state-to-nation imbalance provides an underlying motivation for war and therefore makes certain regions more war-prone than others. The state-to-nation balance refers to the degree of compatibility between the existing division to territorial states and the national aspirations and political identifications of the people in the region. The balance moves on a continuum between symmetry and asymmetry. Symmetry means that there is a compatibility or congruence between the regional states (as entities or institutions administrating a certain territory) and the national sentiments of the peoples in the region (as political aspirations to live as national communities in their own states).[11] In other words, there is a strong identification of the people in the region with the existing states and their territorial identities. The result is that the demand for states and their supply are more or less balanced.

State-to-nation asymmetry prevails when there are nationalist challenges to the existing state-system in a certain region either from below the level of the state (i. e., sub-national ethnic groups aspiring for secession from the state) or from above (i. e., pan-national movements of unification or irridentist-revisionist claims to territories held by other states on the grounds of national affiliation of the population or national-historic rights on the territory). The secessionists claim that there are too few states while the pan-nationalists argue that there are too many states in the region on national grounds. The result is that the supply-demand ratio of states is imbalanced, either the demand considerably exceeds the supply, leading to wars of secession or the supply far outnumbers

---

11. On the definition of state and nation, see Connor (1994), pp. 90-117 and Barrington (1997), pp. 712-716. Especially useful is Barringon's distinction between state and nation.

the demand, resulting in wars of national unification.[12] Thus, the state-to-nation ratio is measured by the power of secessionists, irredentists, nationalist-revisionists and pan-national unifiers in a certain region. Two particular groups who support the revisionist/nationalist agenda are settlers who reside beyond the state boundaries and advocate, with the support of irredentist groups in the homeland, their annexation to the homeland; and refugees who claim the right of return to their homes in their previous places of residence. The more powerful these nationalist forces are in relation to the status-quo states, the greater the state-to-nation imbalance and vice-versa.

Regions with high state-to-nation asymmetry are more prone to wars than others because of three reasons, which are not elaborated here.[13] First, this is due to the emergence of substantive issues of conflict on national grounds (territories and boundaries and also demographic issues such as refugees and settlers).[14] Second, such a high asymmetry provides fertile grounds to the enhancement of other causes of war such as the security dilemma and power rivalries in the region. Third, such an asymmetry produces regional insecurity through the effects of spreading transborder instability. For example, incoherent states produce regional instability because they provide targets for external intervention either out of temptation for profit and expansion or due to insecurity and fear of spreading instability out of the incoherent states. Pan-national forces especially tend to intervene in domestic affairs of other states, and such intervention will be most feasible in incoherent states. Ethnic alliances—cases in which a majority group in one state is a minority group in a neighboring state—increases the likelihood of international conflict (Moore and Davis 1998) where the co-ethnics in one state (the majority group) are propelled by feelings of solidarity with their ethnic kin in a proximate state (the minority). Incoherent states produce secessionist movements which affect also neighbors' security. Because of its weakness, an incoherent state may host, frequently

---

12. Mayall (1990), Van Evera (1995), Miller (1999c).

13. For an elaborate discussion, see Miller (1999a).

14. For studies which show that ethnic/national claims are major sources of territorial conflicts, see Mandel (1980); and Carment (1993).

involuntarily, guerrilla forces which attack neighboring states, or such state may cause problems of refugees in the region.[15]

Thus, addressing this asymmetry may reduce the likelihood of war in a certain region. How this is done is an important component in each of the strategies of peacemaking. Indeed, the state-to-nation balance provides a coherent way to differentiate among the three strategies.

Three Strategies for Regional Peacemaking

There are two basic interrelated differences among the three strategies: whether they focus on capabilities or motivations for war of the regional states, and how the state-to-nation problem is addressed in each of them (see Figure 4).

Figure 4

How the Peacemaking Strategies address the State-to-Nation Problem

Strategy for regional peace	Level of regional peace
great power concert or hegemony moderated	cold peace: state-to-nation asymmetry
regional conflict resolution resolved	normal peace: state-to-nation asymmetry
regional integration transcended	warm peace: state-to-nation asymmetry

The international strategy does not resolve the state-to-nation problem. At best, it moderates the level of the conflict short of establishing high symmetry. The regional conflict strategy strategy confronts the nation-to-state question directly and puts it at center stage by addressing the outstanding territorial and boundaries issues. The regional integration path transcends the state-to-nation problem by aiming at a radical change in the ability and motivation of states to act unilaterally, especially to constrain the resort to force.

One advantage of the international mechanism is that it can deal effectively with the *capabilities* of the regional actors to go to

---

15. See the useful studies in Lake and Rothchild, eds. (1998), and Carment and James, eds. (1997).

war. The regional balance of power depends heavily on external support, notably arms supply by great powers. As a result, the great powers can constrain the regional ability to resort to force by imposing limitations on local military capabilities and by constructing an effective arms control regime. But this can be successful only if a concert of cooperating powers or a stabilizing hegemon are present.

The regional/domestic approaches may address more effectively the *motivations* of the actors, either by changing those motivations directly related to the causes of regional wars such as territorial disputes (through the strategy of regional conflict resolution) or by transcending the causes of such wars through transforming the general motivations and capacities of the regional actors regarding peace and war (the strategy of integration).

As a result, the big advantage of the regional/domestic approaches is that they can establish normal or warm peace, whereas the international strategy can at best bring about cold peace. Regional strategies are also less dependent on the continuing engagement of external powers in the region. Yet, the prerequisites for the success of the regional/domestic strategies are very demanding and sometimes extremely hard to reach. For the conflict resolution strategy to be successful, the regional states must be strong and coherent. The integration strategy can be effective in producing high-level of peace only if there is liberal compatibility among all the key regional participants. At the same time, to the extent that the conducive global conditions exist, the international strategy can be helpful in advancing peaceful regional settlements under state-to-nation asymmetry, even if only cold ones. These cold regional settlements may, in turn, prove conducive to the success of the regional/domestic strategies for promoting higher levels of regional peace. (See Figure 5)

This chart is based on three types of variations. The most basic one refers to the state-to-nation balance: either it is balanced or imbalanced. When it is imbalanced, the major variation is among strategies which change capabilities and which are related to different types of great power engagement (worlds 1 and 2). When it is balanced, the major variation is between two kinds of peace-making strategies of changing intentions (worlds 3 and 4). This variation is related to whether the states are democracies or not.

Figure 5

Regional War and Peace: Changing Intentions and Capabilities
The Effects of Changing Intentions and Capabilities on Transition
from War to Peace and on Peace Stability

The State-to-Nation Balance in the Region

	Imbalanced	Balanced	
	2	4	
Hegemony/	*Cold Peace*	*Warm Peace*	Integration/
Cooperation	(moderated)	(transcended)	Liberalization
Changing Capabilities/ GP Engagement			Changing Intentions
	1	3	
Competition	*Hot/Cold Wars*	*Normal Peace*	Conflict Resolution
Disengagement	(aggravated)	(resolved)	/State-Building

Worlds 1 and 2 consist of regions in which there is an imbalance between nation and state and thus regional conflicts are prevalent and there is a danger of war. In these 2 worlds the type of great power engagement makes a huge difference in contrast to the lesser difference in worlds 3 and 4. Whereas competition and disengagement aggravate the regional conflict and increase the likelihood of resort to force, hegemony and cooperation reduce the level of conflict and produce the conditions for cold peace (world 2). In contrast to world 2, world 1 is in a cold war situation which is interrupted occasionally by the eruption of hot wars according to the decisions of the local parties.[16]

---

16. On this world, see Miller (1999a). Since this article focuses on peacemaking strategies, I will not deal here with the regional effects of great power competition or disengagement. For such a discussion, see Miller (1999b).

World 3 and 4 consist of regions in which there is a high symmetry between the division into states and into nations in the region, namely, the key national groups identify with their own states and their territorial identity, and thus the states accept the current territorial division and the boundaries in the region. This congruity between nations and states can be translated to high levels of peace by processes or strategies which change the intentions of the regional players. In world 3 there is a successful resolution of outstanding territorial and boundary questions, leading to normal peace. There is an agreement among the parties on non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the other states, respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and on peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, the lasting success of the conflict resolution process and the maintenance of a stable peace depends on the presence of coherent states in the region, namely on the success of the state-building and eventually nation-building in the region. Under these conditions the incentives to go to war will be much lower than in a region in which there is state-to-nation asymmetry and weak states are present. In this case, the type of involvement of the great powers will be much less crucial than in worlds 1 and 2 and it will make much less of a difference. The more symmetrical the nation-to-state balance becomes and conflicts are resolved peacefully by coherent states, the less likely that great power competition will spill over to the region and anyway that it exercise major impact on regional outcomes. The inability to achieve strategic gains in the region by meddling in regional conflicts makes it more likely that the great powers will disengage from strategic intervention in the region under the conditions of regional conflict resolution and the presence of coherent states. Under these conditions, it is also less likely that the regional states will need the brokerage services offered by the great powers in comparison with worlds 1 and 2.

In world 4 warm peace is reached by successful regional integration in which there is a voluntary transfer of certain authorities from the regional states to supra-national authorities and pooling of sovereignty. A necessary condition for this particularly high level of peace, in addition to a balanced state-to-nation ratio, is successful democratization and liberalization. But for the initial stages of such liberalization, which might be destabilizing for the transition

period, the presence of a hegemon or concert might be necessary as well, although following the completion of the liberalization process, the leadership of the great powers will be much less needed, if at all, for maintaining the warm peace. A balanced state-to-nation ratio is necessary for reaching warm peace because in an imbalanced situation, democratization may lead, at least in the short-run, to greater instability and ethno-national conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 1996). Yet after the warm peace is stabilized, ethnic conflicts are less likely to lead to violence, surely not to spreading regional instability beyond the specific state engaged in the ethnic conflict.

The next sections will present the effects of the different mechanisms on the level of peace and the conditions for their successful operation.

1. The Global Strategy

The Global Strategy's Effects > Regional Cold Peace

The great powers are able to stabilize a region, to prevent local wars and to advance regional peace, albeit a cold one, in regions vital to the great power interests through the following six inter-related strategies:[17]

1. **Restrain** aggressive local clients intent on wars of expansion by imposing diplomatic, economic, and if necessary, military sanctions.

2. **Reassure** local states and reduce their security dilemmas by the extension of security guarantees, preferably manifested in a regional deployment of their troops. Another strategy that the power(s) may employ to reassure the local states is leading the efforts to construct regional security and crisis prevention regimes and confidence-building measures, thus minimizing the likelihood of inadvertent wars.

3. *Deter* and contain potential aggressors.

4. *Prevent*: pursuing preventive diplomacy to forestall resort to military force or escalation of the use of force.

---

17. For a much more elaborate discussion of these strategies and the related references, see Miller (2000a, 2000b).

5. **Mediate** and reduce the level of the basic regional conflict and thus encourage or impose a cold peace. A hegemon or a concert can help the local states overcome the collective goods problem by being able and willing to pay disproportionate costs for achieving regional peace through the provision of valuable services as a "honest broker": the great power(s) can serve as mediator(s) able to employ powerful pressures and incentives which no other potential mediator can offer.

6. **Guarantee** regional arrangements: the powers can guarantee a regional settlement and serve as final arbiters in case of disagreements among the parties about its interpretation. Concerns about the potential reactions of the powers will motivate the regional parties to adhere to the agreement and to follow its rules and procedures.

The conditions for the effectiveness of the strategy:
the presence of a Hegemon vis-a-vis the region in question[18]

The international strategy of great power regional involvement may lead to regional peace but only if a great power hegemony is present vis-a-vis the region in question.[19] This is based on the logic of the hegemonic-stability perspective.[20] This perspective, drawing on collective goods theory, suggests that the production of such "common goods" as peace and stability requires the presence of a single hegemon that is both able (has dominant capabilities in important issue-areas) and willing to lead (is ready to offer "side

---

18. In another paper I addressed also the stabilizing effects of a concert of great powers and applied them to the 19th century Balkans. See Miller and Kagan (1997). On a concert see also Kupchan and Kupchan (1991). For my purpose here the stabilizing effects of a concert and hegemony are basically similar, but the likelihood of hegemony and its effectiveness are greater than the likelihood of a lasting and cohesive concert.

19. On hegemony and concert, as well as two other modes of great power regional involvement, which are not conducive to promoting peace (competition and disengagement), see Miller and Kagan (1997) and Miller (1999b). On the relationship between these mechanisms and theoretical realist perspectives, see Miller (1996).

20. For overviews of this perspective and references to key works, see Nye (1990), Levy (1991), and Miller (1992, 1996, 1997).

payments" to get other states to join it). The leader sees itself as a major long-term beneficiary of regional peace, and is also able to shape and dominate the regional environment. For this purpose, the hegemon provides a flow of services and benefits to the small states that include diplomatic "good offices," "honest brokerage" or mediation, as well as security guarantees, construction of arms control and crisis-prevention regimes, and deterrence and compellence of military aggressors. Leadership and mediation by a single broker should according to this perspective be more efficacious than that by several great powers, even if they concert their actions, because transaction and information costs are lower.[21] All in all, a single dominant country will be better able and more willing to provide these "goods" than a number of comparatively equal powers, who are more likely to compete among themselves for regional influence than cooperate to ameliorate regional disputes.

A hegemon is likely to be *willing* to invest in regional conflict reduction and to affect a transition from a state of hot or cold war to cold peace for two major reasons: the intrinsic importance of a region, and a shared threat. A distinction has to be made between different regions according to their standing in the great powers' balance of interests. Intrinsically important regions, whose value for the great powers stems from major material resources and also from geographic proximity to the powers, will draw hegemonic involvement and attempts at stabilization.[22]

A major factor which enhances the willingness of the great power(s) to engage in promoting conflict reduction is the presence of a shared threat both to the great power(s) and to the status-quo regional states on the part of an aggressive revisionist power, or weaker regional states with divisive ideologies.[23] The presence of such a shared threat will motivate the power(s) to invest considerable

---

21. On these types of costs, see Keohane (1984), and Oye (1986).

22. For the debate on the importance of various regions to the US, see Walt (1989), Van Evera (1990), David (1992-93), Posen and Ross (1996-97), Gholz, Press and Sapolsky (1997), and Miller (1998c). For the importance of different regions to the great powers, see Miller and Kagan (1997).

23. In contrast to a unifying ideology, a divisive ideology does not respect the autonomy and legitimacy of other like-minded states. Divisive ideologies include communism, hypernationalism, and fascism. Liberal democracy is the major example of a unifying ideology in the post-1945 era. See Walt (1987) and Rock (1989).

resources in forming and leading a countervailing coalition, in deterrence and compellence of the aggressor, and also in a more general brokerage of disputes among the regional states.

Only the presence of a hegemon can make possible the effective operation of the mentioned-above five interrelated mechanisms. Such an effective operation will not be possible if the great powers pursue the alternative strategies of competition or disengagement:

1. **Restrain** aggressive local clients—Unlike a situation of several great powers competing for regional influence, in a concert or hegemonic involvement the small states do not have a realignment option.[24] As a result, the great power(s) need not worry about losing their clients. The client states, for their part, have a lesser maneuvering room and are unable to escape the great power restraining pressure.

2. **Reassure** regional states: under a concert or hegemony regional stability is increased by the reduction in the fears of being attacked on the one hand, and the increase in the costs that an aggressor is likely to pay by having to face the great power sanctions on the other. The regional troop deployment necessary for effective reassurance is possible under a concert or a hegemony because the powers in either of these situations face no constraints from rival great powers and need not fear escalation.

3. **Deter** and contain potential aggressors—Under a concert or a hegemony potential regional aggressors do not enjoy the strategic backing of a rival great power which can neutralize and deter other great powers from intervening. At the same time, the credibility of the great power commitment to ensure stability in the region is high because of their large freedom of maneuver in the absence of countervailing great powers. Thus, the great powers should be able to deter potential regional aggressors and revisionist powers intent on wars of profit. Moreover, in case of deterrence failure, the lack of rival great power constraints on their ability to act militarily should enable the powers to demonstrate their resolve and compel the aggressor to desist through

---

24. See Miller and Kagan (1997).

threats of force and military deployments. If short-of-war coercive diplomacy also fails, the relatively low constraints on the great power freedom of action raise the probability that they will use massive force to maintain the regional order and rollback aggression.

4. **Preventive diplomacy** is more effective when there is a joint action by the great powers or there is a single power who can exercise moderating pressures on all the regional parties because the latter depend heavily on these powers.

5. **Conflict reduction** by mediation: under disengagement, there will not be a credible broker and guarantor for conflict reduction or a banker to compensate the regional actors for their concessions. Under competition the great powers will obstruct each other's attempts to stabilize the region and at least one of the great powers is likely to support a revisionist countervailing coalition which opposes the peace process.

6. **Guarantee:** the enforcement of the cold peace is more reliable under a concert or a hegemony. Under disengagement there will be no powerful actor available for enforcement. If the powers compete, it is likely that one or more of them will support violators of the agreements in the context of their rivalry with the great power which tries to enforce the accords.

The main problem with the international mechanism for regional peace is that it is unable by itself to proceed beyond cold peace. It is beyond the capabilities of external powers to resolve the regional state-to-nation problems or induce domestic liberalization, unless the regional states themselves are willing to undertake these tasks. Thus, a concert or a hegemony, either benign or coercive, are unable by themselves to resolve the underlying issues in conflict and to bring about normal or warm peace in the region. The presence of revisionist regional states decreases the likelihood that normal or warm peace will emerge and that the threat of local war will be completely removed from the long-term agenda of the region. Concerns about their own domestic legitimacy will lead authoritarian regimes to obstruct transnational relations among the regional states, preventing the development of warm peace.

The cold peace is not expected to survive changes in the great power regional involvement. Thus, potential problems with the international mechanism include the powers' difficulty to sustain domestic support for a long-term and costly regional engagement because of public demands to focus on internal affairs. Another danger is the collapse of the concert or the hegemony due to international rather than domestic factors. Changes in the global balance of power, due to a weakening of the hegemon's power or a rise in its competitors' capabilities, may lead to the loss of the hegemon's capacity to stabilize the region, because revisionist local states will be able to receive support from the hegemon's international competitors. The expectation of realist balance of power theory is indeed that any hegemony will be at best temporary because new great powers will rise or a counter-hegemonic coalition will be formed. According to this theory, long-term hegemony is not feasible because of the effective functioning of the equilibrium mechanism which results in the recurrent formation of balances of power.[25] Balance of power theory also expects great powers to compete for influence in different regions rather than cooperate in joint peacemaking efforts.[26] As a result, a concert is also regarded by this theory as, at best, a short-term phenomenon that is likely to disintegrate into great power rivalry.[27] Another possibility is that in the absence of a hegemonic leadership, the great powers may act as "free riders," that is, disengage from peacemaking efforts, rather than attempt to provide the collective good of regional peace.[28] As a result of all these developments, cold regional peace is likely to collapse and revert back to war.

To sum up, while the great powers can be helpful in promoting regional conflict reduction, so long as they and not the local parties play the critical role in the peacemaking process, this process will amount to no more than a mitigation or moderation of the dispute, namely, a cold peace; it would fall short of a full-

---

25. See Wight (1973), p. 100; Rosecrance (1986), pp. 56-58; Layne (1993), pp. 5-51. Waltz (1979), ch. 6.
26. On the differences between the balance of power, the concert and the hegemonic perspectives, see Miller (1992, 1996).
27. See Mearsheimer (1995).
28. On the sources and effects of great power disengagement from regional conflicts, see Miller and Kagan (1997).

blown indigenous reconciliation among the local parties. More-over, the durability of the cold peace depends on the strength and continued presence of the powers in the region. A collapse of the concert or the hegemon or their disengagement from the region may bring about a decline of the cold peace and a return to either cold or hot war.

The strength of pan-national revisionism and sub-national/ ethnic forces made the Balkans before World War I and the Middle East after World War II prone to wars. The difficulties in resolving the state-to-nation issues in these regions due to the absence of conducive regional/domestic factors (coherent or liberal states) made the great powers key players in regional conflict management. Yet, when the great powers competed, they aggravated the regional conflicts. Only when the great powers concerted their actions or a hegemon emerged, regional peace became possible. This was a cold peace, however, since the great powers were unable to fully resolve the state-to-nation problems. The pacifying effects of a concert are illustrated by the case of the Concert of Europe and the Balkans in the period 1815-1880.[29] Stabilizing effects of a great power hegemon are demonstrated by the cases of Germany and the Soviet Union in the Balkans.[30] I will illustrate the relations between hegemony and regional cold peace by the case of the US in the post-1973 Middle East.

The Effects of US Peacemaking in the Middle East >
Transition from a War-Zone to Cold Peace

The post-World War II Middle East was notorious for a multipli-city of state-to-nation problems, posing tough challenges to the regional state-system. A number of stateless nations, some of them spread in a number of states (Kurds, Palestinians and others) demanded the establishment of their own nation-states. There were also demands for pan-national unification (most notably Pan-Arab-ism) or for the abolishment of certain states and the integration of their land in a different national framework: Israel in an integrated Arab state or "Greater Palestine," Lebanon and Jordan as part of "Greater Syria" or Kuwait as part of "Greater Iraq." Irredentist

---

29. See Miller and Kagan (1997).
30. See Miller and Kagan (1997).

demands were also common both by "Greater Israel" advocates and by the Arabs vis-a-vis the post-1967 occupied territories (the West Bank, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights). Such a state-to-nation asymmetry was an underlying cause of high regional war-propensity and made the achievement of regional peace very difficult. Thus, external powers have become essential for moderating the level of the conflict. The great power, most able to play this role, was the US, which after the 1973 war, and especially the Gulf War, became the hegemonic power in the region.

The US has employed the various strategies available to a great power for promoting a transition from a regional war zone to cold peace:

— restraining its client Israel (notably in times of local wars, when it posed a threat to Arab capitals, such as at the end of the 1967 and 1973 wars, or when its use of force could potentially cause an escalation of the conflict, such as during the 1956 war and the Gulf War) and applying diplomatic and economic pressure to induce its moderation in the regional peace process, for example, during the reassessment crisis of Spring 1975.[31] The Ford administration decided to reassess its policy toward Israel following Secretary Kissinger's abortive effort of March 1975 to mediate an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. The new policy included several punitive measures in the form of implicit threats as well as limited sanctions.[32]

— reassuring its allies through arms supply and security cooperation and assistance (to Israel, Jordan, the Gulf states and post-Camp David Egypt), crucial financial assistance (to Israel, Egypt and Jordan) and security guarantees (to the Gulf states).

— coercion of revisionist regional powers by sanctions and use of force:

In contrast to its attitude toward its friends in the region, the US has imposed economic sanctions and arms embargoes on states perceived to be hostile towards the US, its regional interests and

---

31. See Spiegel, (1985), pp. 291-305; and Ben-Zvi (1993), ch. 4.
32. For details, see Ben-Zvi (1993), pp. 97-98.

the advancement of the peace process, specifically Iraq, Libya, Iran and Sudan.[33] A notable example of a containment strategy toward revisionist powers by the imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions and arms embargo is the Clinton administration's dual containment vis-a-vis both Iran and Iraq.[34]

When diplomatic and economic means seemed to be insufficient for defending its key interests, the US was willing to resort to military means to maintain the regional order. Washington exercised deterrence,[35] later compellence, and when both of these strategies failed to prevent aggression, ultimately was willing to fight and defeat a regional aggressor (Iraq in the Gulf War).[36]

— preventive diplomacy: whenever there was an acute danger of resort to force, the US tried to prevent an escalation and to stop the fighting by exercising moderating pressures on all the belligerents. This applies to the various clashes between Israelis and its Arab neighbors and with the Palestinians in the occupied territories and to the hostilities in Lebanon over the recent three decades involving Israel, Syria, Lebanese militias and Palestinians guerrillas (especially until the 1982 Lebanon War).

— playing an active mediating role in moderating the level of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1967 successive US administrations have undertaken a long series of unilateral diplomatic efforts intended to promote the reduction of this conflict under exclusive US auspices.[37]

33. Feldman (1996, p. 35).
34. Hudson (1996, p. 340).
35. On US deterrence policy in the Middle East, see Craig and George (1995, pp. 186-88).
36. For an analysis, see Herrmann (1994); and Miller (1998c).
37. For a short survey, see Miller (1997, pp. 116-120). Examples include the diplomatic initiatives made in 1970-71 by the State Department in the first Nixon administration, dubbed Rogers I, II, III, and IV; Kissinger's unilateral, step-by-step "shuttle diplomacy" which produced the disengagement accords of 1974 between Israel and Egypt (Sinai I, January 1974), and between Israel and Syria (May 1974), and the Sinai II interim accord between Israel and Egypt (September 1975); Carter's mediation of the Camp David accords (September 1978) and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (March 1979); Reagan's "fresh start" initiative of September 1, 1982; and the diplomatic efforts made by the Bush administration in

Moreover, the US serves, in fact, as the guarantor of the accords reached between Israelis and Arabs since 1973 and as a final arbiter / referee in case of disagreements among the parties about the interpretation of a settlement. For example, an important component of the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreements in the Sinai in the aftermath of the Yom-Kippur war has been the US role in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the agreements, including an American commitment to administer early-warning stations at the buffer zone and to conduct regular reconnaissance flights over the demilitarized area established by the accord. In the Camp-David accords the US was active in the establishment and manning of the international force that was deployed in the Sinai.[38]

While US involvement has been conducive to the establishment of cold peace in some parts of the Middle East, peacemaking has not progressed much beyond this level. Thus, the threat of war has not disappeared completely from the Israeli-Egyptian relations (despite their having been at peace since 1979), let alone from the Israeli-Syrian arena, where there are still many unresolved substantive issues related to the recognition of Israel, normalization of Syrian-Israeli relations, security arrangements, and the legitimacy of boundaries. Even in the two Arab states who have signed peace agreements with Israel (Egypt and Jordan), there are still significant elites who continue to regard Israel as illegitimate and oppose the development of transnational relations with it, at least partly because of the lack, thus far, of a permanent settlement of the Palestinian problem. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is currently at the last stage of the implementation of interim agreements, while most of the substantive issues in conflict are still hotly disputed in the negotiations on the final-status agreement. These issues include the demand of the Palestinians to exercise the right of self-determination, the construction of legitimate boundaries between Israel and the Palestinians, the status of Jerusalem, and the settlement of the Palestinian refugees. The peace process at its current stage is still heavily dependent on US diplomatic, economic

---

the wake of the Gulf War, culminating in the convening of the Madrid peace conference in October 1991. The Clinton Administration was very active in trying to mediate peace agreements, in various degrees of success, between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria.

38. See Mandell (1990), Mandell and Tomlin (1991), and Quandt (1993).

and security support for the Palestinian track and even more so for the Syrian-Israeli negotiations.

The Conditions for the Effectiveness of the Strategy:
The Rise of US Hegemony in the Middle East

The global Cold War and superpower competition in the Middle East in the 1948-73 period prolonged the Arab-Israeli conflict and made it difficult to move beyond a regional cold war to cold peace, that is, to reduce the level of the regional conflict.[39] Thus, the superpowers had major effects on the persistence and longevity of the Arab-Israeli conflict; they helped to sustain it by arms supply and diplomatic and economic support of their respective clients.

What's more, a strategic backing of their clients by the super-powers, namely the commitment to come to their aid in times of crisis by arms resupply and issuing threats of intervention when the clients were attacked and the survival of their regimes was threatened, reduced the costs and risks of continuing the conflict for the client states, including by resort to force.

In the post-1973 period the US gradually managed to exclude the Soviet Union from involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to establish a partial hegemony over the region, becoming the common great power patron of Israel and Egypt. The US hege-mony became more complete with the end of the Cold War and Soviet disintegration,[40] when other Arab parties to the conflict, notably the Palestinians and Syria, lost the possibility of recourse to a rival superpower patron, who could shield them from the adverse effects and costs of opposition to US-led peacemaking efforts.

The US has played a leading role in cooling the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1973 war. US leadership helped to moderate the conflict, to initiate an Arab-Israeli peace process, and specifically to establish a cold peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978-9.[41] Follow-ing the Gulf war, a more comprehensive cold peace was established,

---

39. For an extended discussion of the argument made in this section, see Miller (1999b).
40. See Miller (1997); Hudson (1996).
41. See Touval (1982), chs. 9, 10; Telhami (1990); Ben Zvi (1993); Quandt (1993). On recent developments in this cold Israeli-Egyptian peace (before the Nethanyahu government assumed office in Israel in June 1996 and subsequent events made it arctic), see Gerges (1995).

manifested in the Madrid process involving Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan and most Arab states.[42] It is extremely hard to imagine the progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process since 1973 without the active mediation and the financial assistance of the US to Israel and to the two parties which signed peace treaties with it—Egypt and Jordan. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of Soviet power, and the blow inflicted by the US to Iraqi military power, and thus to Arab radicalism, in the Gulf War changed the strategic landscape in the region by reinforcing the power of the status-quo players (Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, the PLO and Israel) at the expense of the revisionists (notably, Iraq and Iran) and thus made possible the accomplishments in Arab-Israeli diplomacy in the 1990s. The Gulf War dramatically demonstrated the security dependence of both Israelis and most Arab states on US military power.

US economic power also provides it with important leverage both through direct financial assistance to key regional players and through the provision of credit and technology transfers. More-over, the central role played by the US aid makes any peace agree-ment between Israel and an Arab party an accord between each party and the US not less than a bilateral Arab-Israeli peace. The expectation to receive substantial military and economic assistance from the US was a major motivation for joining the US-led peace process by Egypt in the late 1970s and Jordan, the Palestinians and Syria in the 1990s. For Israel, the vast amounts of annual aid from the US was a crucial compensation for its willingness to concede peacefully to the Arabs tangible goods—the occupied territories—as part of a "land for peace" formula. The continuous US econo-mic aid and its military dependence on the US provides an important incentive for Egypt to continue to adhere to the peace process even in the face of what it views as Israeli intransigence. Similarly, the Israeli economic-diplomatic-military dependence on the US moderates its policy with regard to both the use of force and concessions in the peace process.

As for the US willingness to play the role of the hegemon in the Middle East, it stems from the intrinsic importance of the region to US interests due to the location of vast oil resources there. This produces an American interest in maintaining good

---

42. See Indyk (1992); Quandt (1993); Lieber (1995).

relations with the Arab states. Such an interest conflicts with the US political/ideological/moral commitment to Israel's security. The US tries to reconcile this conflict of interests by advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process. US attempts during the Cold War to construct an Arab-Israeli grand alliance against the supposedly shared Soviet threat have failed because local parties diverge from great powers by tending to focus on regional threats rather than on global ones. In contrast to the highly dubious and disputed Soviet threat to the regional states, following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi revisionism has posed a true shared threat to the US (because of the threat to the regional oil resources), Israel and status-quo Arab states. Thus, the US was able to lead a multinational coalition, which included most Arab states, and in the aftermath of its victory over Iraq to promote the Arab-Israeli peace process. As the US is both democratic and distant from the region, the form of its hegemony has been benign, with an emphasis on encouraging (rather than imposing) a regional order and peace.

2. Regional/Domestic Strategies
The Strategy of Regional Conflict Resolution

The resolution of regional state-to-nation problems, especially their territorial manifestations, reduces the likelihood of wars in the region quite considerably. But so long as there are incoherent states in the region, successful conflict resolution is less likely. Moreover, the presence of coherent states in the region is necessary for the stability of the peace accords and for reaching the level of regional normal peace for an extended period.

The Effects of Conflict Resolution Normal Peace

This strategy suggests that rather than relying on external powers, the regional parties should focus on directly addressing the state-to-nation issues in dispute among them through negotiation and conflict resolution.[43] More specifically, the parties should settle the

---

43. On negotiations and conflict resolution, see, for example, Mitchell (1981, pp. 275-7), Patchen (1988), Kriesberg (1992), Hopmann (1994), and Zartman and Kremenyuk (1995). For an overview and references, see Craig and George (1995), pp. 163-179.

substantive manifestations of the state-to-nation issues in dispute, such as recognize all the other states in the region, agree on acceptable boundaries, resolve territorial conflicts and problems of refugees and negotiate a fair division of scarce resources such as water.

A resolution of these problems will lessen the motivations of the regional states for going to war, and thus will markedly reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of wars in the region.[44] More specifically, conflict resolution will make less likely the occurrence of the three major types of regional wars: security dilemma wars, profit wars and diversionary wars.[45] With regard to security dilemma (or inadvertent) wars, in accordance with the logic of the conflict resolution strategy, it is the extent and severity of unresolved issues that accounts for regional variations in the intensity of the security dilemma.[46] The extent of unresolved problems conditions the security dilemma and the war-proneness of different regions. In other words, when there is a high state-to-nation symmetry, and thus the territorial division among the states is widely accepted, the intensity of the security dilemma is lower, and it is less likely that mutual fears of being attacked and preempted will dominate the relations among the regional states and vice versa.[47] Thus, the security dilemma is unlikely to lead to war among any type of potential neighbors, but only when there is a high state-to-nation asymmetry, resulting in sharp territorial disagreements.

Nationalist irredentism provides substantive issues for wars of profit or expansion, namely, boundaries, territory and struggle for

---

44. For empirical findings about the connection between resolved territorial disputes and declining likelihood of war in comparison with unresolved teritorial conflicts, which are an extremely potent predictor of interstate war see Kocs (1995). Although these findings make a lot of sense, the question is whether there are causal relations or only correlations. In other words, what does explain the variations between resolved and unresolved conflicts? Moreover, while Kocs focuses on interstate dyads, I deal with regional war and peace, which is affected also by civil/ethnic conflicts since these may have transborder regional security effects. In this context, the state-to-nation balance plays a key role.

45. On these types of wars, see, for example, Stein (1993) and Miller (forth-coming).

46. On the security dilemma, see Jervis (1978), Buzan (1991), and Miller (1995), ch. 1.

47. For a partly related argument, see Wendt (1992), and Schweller (1996).

hegemony. The resolution of these disputes will directly reduce the likelihood of wars of profit. Diversionary wars, on the other hand, are produced by problems of domestic illegitimacy, related in many cases to nation-to-state problems. These wars reflect an aggressive policy which arises out of domestic political weakness and insecurity of the elite. This is the diversionary or scapegoat theory of externalizing domestic conflict and instability in order to strengthen the hold of the ruling elite on power. Nationalist elites, in particular, are likely to try to rally their ethno-national group around the flag against another ethnic group.[48] Thus, a resolution of regional disputes will not address this kind of wars directly. Yet, diversionary wars are also more likely under a state-to-nation imbalance which leads to sharp boundary and territorial disagreements: it is much easier for an insecure elite in an unstable regime to initiate war in a region in which there is a low rather than high level of acceptance of the current borders because such low acceptance provides ready pretexts for war.

In contrast, the resolution of state-to-nation problems strengthens local states and increases their domestic stability, because of the resolution of secessionist problems which may have posed a major challenge to ruling elites and thus have increased their insecurity. Thus, mutual recognition and the acceptance of boundaries strengthen the regional states not only externally but also internally vis-à-vis their own societies, and increase the stability of their political regimes. As a result, the likelihood of scapegoat wars will also be lower if the territorial manifestations of the state-to-nation asymmetry are resolved.

The Conditions for the Effectiveness of the Conflict Resolution Strategy: The presence of Strong/Coherent states in the region

Yet, the relationship between stable and strong states and regional conflict resolution is a complex one. While regional conflict resolution strengthens local states because of the acceptance of their sovereignty and boundaries by their neighbors, the other side of the coin is that the effectiveness and durability of conflict resolution is heavily dependent on the prior presence of strong states in the region. State strength (or coherence) is a different and separate

48. See Levy (1989), Lebow (1981), and Snyder (1991).

concept from the realist notion of state power or capabilities. It has three main dimensions: the effectiveness of state institutions; the level of identification of the citizens with the state; and the firmness of the territorial identity of the state, namely, the extent of acceptance and permanence of its boundaries in the eyes of its neighbors and domestic groups.[49] The latter two dimensions are interrelated and also heavily affect the state-to-nation symmetry and thus the regional war-propensity, because a low level of citizen identification and a lack of firm territorial identity may result in attempts at secession and border changes which may spillover and involve a number of regional states. As a result, these two dimensions are the two most relevant for regional war and peace. In other words, the weaker the regional states on these two dimensions, the greater the state-to-nation problem, the lesser the regional and domestic stability and greater the obstacles for effective conflict resolution; conversely, the stronger the states on these two dimensions, the greater the likelihood for successful conflict resolution and thus for normal peace.[50]

Under state-to-nation asymmetry even elites which are interested in making peace face serious domestic and external constraints in incoherent and unstable states. Nationalist/ethnic forces oppose making territorial concessions either on demographic grounds (the territories are populated by ethnic kin) or due to national-historical-religious attachments to these territories. Nationalists manipulate such causes against moderate elites who have limited maneuvering freedom in incoherent states. Weak states are also vulnerable to pressures by other states which are able to intervene in their domestic affairs and can make it difficult to pursue moderate policies. Under the pressures of secessionist movements it is difficult to reach stable peace agreements with neighbors who may also face nationalist and ethnic pressures. Irredentist forces, for their part, fight against concessions. Ambitious politicians use the nationalist/ethnic cards in order to promote themselves and thus make it difficult to pursue moderate policies. Mobilization against external national/ethnic enemies is a major diversionary tactic in order to mobilize mass support by political leaders in incoherent states. This

---

49. See Buzan (1991, ch. 2), Ayoob (1995), Holsti (1996).
50. See Ayoob (1995), pp. 194-6.

is especially the case in regions populated by states which are considered illegitimate by some of their neighbors or by peoples which are not seen as qualified to have their own states (Israel and the Palestinians, the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and in Iran, Taiwan and China, South and North Vietnam, South and North Korea, Russia and Chechnya, etc.). Nation-to-state imbalance produces conflict-prone regions with deep-seated animosity among neighbors. Such neighbors with a long history of rivalry have a hard time over-coming by themselves a legacy of mutual fears and suspicion, and it will be difficult for them to resolve conflicts without external support, mediation and assurances and to agree on issues like boundaries, on which they have incompatible positions. A related challenge to the conflict resolution strategy is presented by powerful (although not domestically coherent) irredentist states which claim to have historical/national/ethnic rights to control territories belonging to their neighbors. Domestic instability in these irredentist states due to incoherence produces additional incentives for externalizing internal conflicts and thus for the use of force against proximate states which are unable to deter such aggressors and defend themselves against them.

To overcome these obstacles to regional conflict resolution, state building is necessary. Thus, the strategy of conflict resolution may also be called the "statist" strategy, because it gives priority to strengthening the state and consolidating its power over separatist groups. This is done by monopolizing the instruments of violence in the state's hands (namely, disarming the secessionist groups) and maintaining its territorial integrity.[51] At the minimum the regional states should be in the process of strengthening their institutional base for attempts at conflict resolution to be effective. This strengthening includes maintenance of law and order, development of bureaucracy, taxation, constitution, and the ability to provide socio-economic services.[52] In order for conflict resolution to bring about stable peace, the state-building should be followed by a nation-building process, which, if successful, leads to identification of the major groups within the state with its existing territorial identity at the expense of nationalist-revisionist and ethnic-

---

51. Ayoob (1995, pp. 182-4) and the sources he cites.
52. Weiner (1987), p. 59.

secessionist forces. Nation-building includes the provision of non-material symbolic functions to the populations through a national educational system and myth-making.

Under these conditions, many regional conflicts are more likely to be resolved and wars are more likely to be prevented. The greater state coherence makes it more difficult for pan-nationalist ideologies to penetrate the state and to challenge pragmatic policies. Coherent states will thus be both more stable internally and less vulnerable to domestic and transnational pressures to adopt hard-line positions which make a resort to force more likely and peaceful resolution of the regional conflicts less feasible. In other words, coherent states are more likely to endorse pragmatic international orientations and to behave cautiously according to cost-benefit (strategic and economic) calculations rather than ideological/emotional nationalist commitments and sentiments.[53] Such sentiments and symbols make it more difficult to bargain and to reach compromises and accommodation than materialist/rationalist considerations according to which it is frequently more profitable to negotiate peaceful arrangements rather than going to a costly war (Fearon 1995). Coherent states are also less hospitable to guerrilla/terrorist organizations which conduct armed infiltrations into neighboring states. Because secessionist movements in coherent states are in decline, these states are also less likely to produce such guerrilla forces. Coherent states are also less likely to trigger destabilizing refugee movements across borders, or to invite armed intervention by neighbors bent on exploiting opportunities for expansion or worried about security threats from secessionist or irredentist elements present in unstable neighboring states. In this sense the formation of coherent states decreases the security dilemma in the region. It also reduces the motivation of unstable elites for diversionary wars, as well as the motivation and opportunity for wars of profit. All these processes reinforce the standing of status-quo elites who are more able and willing to reach normal peace based on mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

---

53. This is the idea of "stateness" according to Ben-Dor (1983).

The problem is that state-building and especially nation-building are difficult to accomplish in regions with nation-to state imbalance where many states are weak and lack firm territorial identity manifested in the presence of national/ethnic minorities which claim to exercise the right of self-determination, establish their own states through secession or be annexed to a contiguous state dominated by their ethnic kin, who, for their part, favor irredentism.[54] This tension is especially severe in the Third World and the Balkans, due to the artificially-drawn post-colonial boundaries of the states and the arbitrary allocation of peoples and territory to states in these regions.[55] Numerous post-colonial states are either composed of distinct and sometimes hostile ethnic groups, or previously homogenous ethnic communities are divided between two or more states. Most regimes in Africa and the Middle East have faced major domestic legitimacy problems because they preside over artificial colonial constructs that are very vulnerable to internal challenges. Thus, most new Third World states have faced problems of either secession or irredentism soon after independence.[56]

These problems are highly aggravated by exclusionary policies of ethnic discrimination and economic exploitation by the dominant ethno-national groups who maintain their exclusive control over the political and economic systems and the military.[57] At the same time, the possibilities for state-building by internal or external coercion as well as by economic bribes were constrained by the economic and military weakness of the central authorities in many states. Such weakness also produced high economic and security dependence on the Western powers, which, in turn exerted pressures against violent policies and massive violations of human rights, thus making it even more difficult to build states through coercion.[58]

---

54. See, for example, Diamond and Plattner (1994), p. xv. For a list of all the claims for self-determination according to the different regions, see Halperin and Scheffer (1992); For a comprehensive list of ethnopolitical conflicts in 1993, see Gurr (1994), pp. 160-166.

55. See Ayoob (1995, p. 48); Buzan (1991); Jackson (1990); Job (1992); Kacowicz (1998); Holsti (1996).

56. Ayoob (1995, pp. 34-35); Buzan (1991); Holsti (1996). On secession and irredentism, see Carment and James (1997), pp. 194-231.

57. Weiner (1987), pp. 35-36, 40-41.

58. Ayoob (1995).

The difficulty in state-building poses severe problems for the conflict resolution strategy: as noted, this strategy depends on strong states, but under state-to-nation imbalance, state building is difficult. In other words, state-building is least feasible where it is most needed.

A possible solution maybe democratization since a democratic regime can be very helpful for strengthening the state in the long run, especially the identification of the population with the state which gives them political rights and reduce ethnic-based discrimination. Yet, for the short-run, democratization in weak states may further weaken the state and bring about its disintegration (see below). For this reason, the conflict resolution/state building strategy gives priority to consolidating state power over domestic groups at the expense of, and as a prior prerequisite for, democratization. Thus, regional integration/liberalization and regional conflict resolution/state building constitute distinct and competing approaches to regional peacemaking. One possible way to make them complementary is in the framework of an integrated-gradual approach discussed at the end of the article.

Twentieth-Century South America:
State building > Conflict Resolution > The Evolution
of Normal Regional Peace
The Effects: Conflict Resolution > Transition from War
to Normal Peace

Nineteenth-century South America was an area of chronic war and armed intervention, for example, the war of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay against Paraguay in 1865-70 (Lynch 1993, pp. 40-46), the Pacific war among Chile, Bolivia and Peru (1779-1883), and armed conflicts over boundaries between Brazil and its southern neighbors: Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.[59] But since 1941 there has been no inter-state war in the region.[60] Moreover, as K.

---

59. Seckinger (1984); Kacowicz (1996), p. 19; D'Agostino (1997), p. 52 and Fraser (1997), p. 158.

60. The two wars during the 20th century were the Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932-35 and the war between Peru and Ecuador in 1941, although military clashes between the latter pair took place also in 1981 and 1995.

J. Holsti (1996, ch. 8) suggests, in the twentieth century this region has become a no-war zone where mutually peaceful relations and non-violent modes of conflict resolution are the norm.[61] Except for North America, South America has been the most peaceful area in the world in the twentieth century. The region has shown a marked inclination towards conflict settlement as compared to other regions, for example, by frequently using arbitrage procedures and subscribing to many multilateral treaties. No regional state has disappeared or has been born as a result of violence in the 20th century, and there have been only few minor territorial changes in the region. Thus, South America as a region has moved during the 20th century toward normal peace, even if an incomplete one, as some pairs of states did not reach normal peace during some periods (Holsti 1996, pp. 158-161). But in a comparative regional basis, the number of territorial conflicts that were resolved peacefully in South America remains unique (Kacowicz 1994, pp. 265-94; Kacowicz 1998; Holsti 1996, p. 156).

Thus, in contrast to the continuous domestic instability in most countries of the region, regional legitimacy in South America has been strengthened since the end of the 19th century due to a process of conflict resolution. The normative basis for the peaceful settlement of the vast majority of border disputes in the region was established through the common recognition of the principle of *uti possidetis*, according to which the South American states accepted the colonial boundaries as their post-independence international frontiers.[62] The regional states also accepted the norms of the sovereign equality of states and of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The Estrada Doctrine (1930) held that if a particular government controlled population and territory, it deserved to be accorded diplomatic recognition and no normative evaluation or criterion should be applied (Fraser 1997, p. 160).

An especially important factor in the evolution of normal peace is that the most powerful state in the region, Brazil, has been a status quo state and has not entertained expansionist aspirations (Calvert 1969, pp. 39-40).

---

61. Kacowicz (1998) calls it a zone of "negative peace."
62. See Child (1985); Ireland (1938); Kacowicz (1998).

The Necessary Conditions: Growing State Coherence
and State-to-Nation Balance > Less War-Proneness
and More Successful Conflict Resolution

A major explanation for the emergence of this normal peace is the growing state strength and coherence during the 20th century in the region. This is especially true with regard to the territorial identity of the states in South America. This evolution is in contrast to both the state weakness in the region during the 19th century and the domestic illegitimacy of certain regimes, which lasted at least until the recent wave of democratization in the 1980s.

South America was better disposed than Europe to enjoy peace relatively early because the state-to-nation balance was more symmetrical there in an earlier stage. Such symmetry reflects the emergence of territorially-based, non-ethnic (or civic) nationalism and the relative weakness of both ethnic/sub-national secessionist forces and pan-national revisionism. Benedict Anderson writes about the emergence of national identities ("nation-ness") in South America, well before most of Europe, which were compatible with the territorial boundaries of the colonial administrative units that became independent states. He argues that "the original shaping of the American administrative units was to some extent arbitrary and fortuitous, marking the spatial limits of particular military conquests. But, over time, they developed a firmer reality under the influence of geographic, political and economic factors" (1991, p. 52). Thus, the European settlers (the Creoles) consciously redefined the non-white populations in their territorial states as "fellow-nationals" (p. 50).[63] At same time, "the 'failure' of the Spanish-American experience to generate a permanent Spanish-American-wide nationalism reflects both the general level of development of capitalism and technology in late eighteenth century and the 'local' backwardness of Spanish capitalism and technology in relation to the administrative stretch of the empire" (p. 63).

While pan- and sub-nationalism and their de-stabilizing effects were much weaker than in Europe, still 19th century South American states were relatively weak and incoherent and thus most

---

63. For a comparative discussion and qualifications, see Connor (1994), esp. p. 79.

boundaries were not clearly defined and some states seized territories belonging to their neighbors. Argentina, for example, was highly fragmented during most of the 19th century.[64] There was no effective central government whose authority was accepted by all. Monopoly over the use of force was absent: every city and province had its own militia, and different war-lords (Caudillos) had their private militias. Also absent were a central constitution and a common judiciary and there was no central education system apart from that of the Church. The period was characterized by a continuous struggle between the hegemonic attempts of Buenos-Aires and the aspirations of the provinces for autonomy and independence from the center. During the 1870s there was both an intensive fighting between the white settlers and the Indians in the frontier and armed conflicts between the different regions and Caudillos. Indeed, the incoherence of the Argentinean state, together with the weakness of the neighboring states at that time, made the region conducive to wars. Thus, the weakness of Argentina brought about the intervention of its neighbors in its territory, especially Brazil and also forces from Uruguay and Paraguay.[65] Moreover, state weakness generated diversionary wars such as the participation of Argentina in the war against Paraguay.[66]

Only since 1880s political stability began to prevail through the dominance achieved by the center over the provinces.[67] This superiority was based first of all on a monopoly over the use of force reached by the national army which disarmed the militias. State coherence was augmented by an expansion of the central administrative-judicial control into the provinces supported by an impressive economic growth in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Moreover, the elites succeeded in helping to construct a common Argentinean identity and unifying national myths. Even though there were conflicts between liberal and nationalist variants and sharp ideological disagreements about political and socio-economic affairs, all shared a collective Argentinean identity including a common territorial identity of the nation-state.[68]

64. See Merquior (1987); Lynch (1993).
65. Shumway (1991), pp. 169-70.
66. Shumway (1991), pp. 237-40.
67. Gallo (1993); Kacowicz (1996), p. 19.
68. Shumway (1991).

This development is also true for other states in the region. Thus, in the 20th century, the territorial identity of the states in South America has become more firmly established and there has been growing state strength and coherence in the region. Citizens may have been alienated from particular governments, as many were before the democratization of the 1980s, but they have generally accepted and defended the overall identity of their states, including their territorial integrity and dimensions. Despite a great variety of powerful domestic grievances, and in contrast to other Third World and Balkans states, disaffected domestic groups in South American states have not sought secession as a solution to their problems. Rather, levels of citizen identification with their states have been progressively strengthening (Holsti 1996, pp. 173-75).

Neither the change from the 19th century war-prone South America to a much more peaceful region, nor the comparative differences between South America and other regions can be explained by the international factor of US hegemony. First of all, South America has been a secondary arena for all the great powers[69] in comparison with Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Even US engagement in the region, especially in the strategic domain, was much more limited than in the US sphere of influence in Central America. In contrast to the numerous military interventions in the latter region, the US did not intervene militarily in South America and even clandestine interferences (like in Chile in the early 1970s) were rare.[70] In the absence of a credible and persistent threat of intervention, it is difficult to see the US as a hegemon in South America (in contrast to Central America). Had the US hegemony been the major cause of regional peace, recent international changes should supposedly have had de-stabilizing effects on the region because US influence in South America has been steadily declining in the last thirty years, with the rise of regional powers such as Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, and the consolidation of international links between South American states and Europe, Japan, and the former Soviet Union.[71] And yet, not

---

69. Fraser (1997), pp. 160-61; Kacowicz (1996), p. 20.
70. Thus, President Theodore Roosevelt confined his amendment to the Monro Doctrine to the Caribbean Basin alone. See Schoultz 1998, pp. 192-7, 203-4 cited in Kagan (2000, ch. 5, p. 8).
71. See Pastor (1992), and Kacowicz (1996, pp. 19-20; 1998, p. 67).

only has peace in South America persisted but it has been upgraded in recent years despite these international changes. Indeed, the character of the regional peace goes beyond internationally-produced cold peace in that most substantive issues in conflict among the regional states have been resolved rather than merely mitigated or reduced. As noted, the achievement of such a level of peace is beyond the capabilities of external powers.

While a normal peace has evolved in South America during this century, until recently it did not go much beyond an inter-state peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. However, in the last few years a process of upgrading the normal peace and the evolution of warm regional peace has begun in the Southern Cone of South America. This warming of the regional peace follows the recent wave of democratization and liberalization there. The major manifestations of this process are increased economic interdependence and the enhancement of economic and political integration, notably, the emergence of a Common Market—Mercosur, which includes Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.[72] There is also growing cooperation with regard to common transborder problems such as the environment and drug trafficking. This rising regional cooperation and integration stands in complete contrast to the failure of previous attempts at economic cooperation and integration, which collapsed when the domestic regimes in South America were authoritarian (Schmitter 1991, pp. 115-116).

3. The Effects of Regional Integration > Warm Regional Peace

Partly in response to the difficulties of the conflict resolution approach in regions with a state-to-nation imbalance, the third approach prescribes that the best strategy to achieve regional peace is not to focus on the substantive state-to-nation and related territorial issues that are in conflict between the parties but to *transcend* them by regional integration. In other words, the best way to reach peace is by establishing effective regional institutions for collective security and arms control, regional economic integration, and cooperation in other issues of common concern such as the environment. More specifically, the leading theory of integration, neofunctionalism,

---

72. See Schmitter (1991, pp. 108-121); Holsti (1996, pp. 175-180); Kacowicz (1998); Solingen (1998).

suggested that growing interdependence would lead to the establishment of supranational institutions. These institutions, led by technical elites and international bureaucrats, would initially deal with the management of technical "low politics" type of problems. But the rising complexity of interdependence and the self-sustaining process of institution-building would eventually lead to the "spill over" of the regional integration to the domain of "high politics." Thus, regional institutions would have increasing jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. This would result in a transfer of loyalties from the nation-state and the redefinition of collective identities toward a regional identity.[73]

Figure 6: The Process of Regional Integration

rising interdependence > low-politics > spill-over to high politics > shifting loyalties from the states institutions to regional institutions

Another method for strengthening peace according to the integrative approach is by creating a regional community through advancing transnational contacts among the regional societies, nongovernmental groups, and encouraging people-to-people ties through social communications, tourism and cultural exchange.[74] Thus, this approach differs markedly from, and goes much beyond the governmental, state-to-state character of the regional conflict resolution strategy. Indeed, regional integration and transnational contacts might be seen by non-liberal, nationalist elites as posing a threat to the independence and autonomy of their states, which is a mainstay of regional peace according to the conflict resolution/state building approach. In contrast to the focus of the conflict resolution/statist approach on the strict preservation of state sovereignty and on non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states as a prerequisite for peace, the integration strategy is based on significant compromises to state sovereignty and on the transfer of

---

73. See Haas (1958, 1964); Lindberg (1963), Lindberg and Scheingold, eds., (1971). For a useful overview, see Hurrell (1995), pp. 59-61.
74. See Deutsch (1957). For a recent development and revision of Deutsch's approach to community building along constructivist lines, see Adler and Barnett (1998).

authorities from the states to supra-national institutions leading to joint decision-making and the pooling of sovereignty.[75]

Some of the supposed effects of regional integration on the emergence of warm peace are:

1. **Politically** – the joint decision-making and pooling of sovereignty would diminish the capacity of national governments to act unilaterally, including in the area of war and peace, especially vis-a-vis the other members. At the same time, a certain degree of freedom of action may remain vis-a-vis third parties.

2. **Economically** – interdependence would make it very difficult to act alone and would limit the independent war-making ability of the individual states. Interdependence would increase mutual prosperity and thus increase the stakes of many key groups and the public at large in the continuation and intensification of the economic relations rather than disrupt them by war. Thus, on a cost-benefit calculation territorial gains will not worth the loss incurred by the disruption of the economic interdependence (in addition to the costs of the war itself). Even if the integration starts in "low politics" (economics, environment), over time there will be a spillover to "high politics" (security and foreign policy).[76]

3. **Sense of community** – common supra-national institutions, strong economic ties and intensive transnational interactions in the areas of culture, tourism and commerce lead to the construction of a sense of community and shared identity and mutual identification at the expense of exclusionary and aggressive nationalism. Thus, it becomes unimaginable that the members of the community will fight each other along national lines.

---

75. Keohane and Hoffmann (1990), p. 276. See also Kupchan (1998).
76. Haas (1958, 1964), summarized by Scmitter (1969), cited in Russett and Starr (1992, p. 384).

The Conditions for the Effectiveness
of the Integration Strategy:
the prevalence of liberal compatibility

Although rarely explored explicitly, liberal democracy is a necessary, even if not always sufficient, condition for successful integration.[77] Thus, the neofunctionalist approach to regional integration presumed without stating explicitly that the states undergoing integration are pluralist democracies. This is because the core integrating mechanism of the neofunctional approach, the autonomous action of specialized interest groups pressing for further integration in order to capture greater economic benefits, can only operate in a liberal democracy.[78] Moreover, liberal democracy can mitigate the aggressive and de-stabilizing aspects of nationalism. Where democratic norms are closely related to national self-images, nationalism may support peaceful democracy by advancing identifications with civic institutions.[79]

There is a qualitative difference between democracies and authoritarian regimes with respect to integration, because the latter type of regime is in itself a major obstacle to integration. These regimes tend to suppress or distort negotiations among transnational interest groups and to assert their passionate defense of national sovereignty as the major source of domestic legitimacy (Schmitter 1991, p. 115). A major reason for the necessary connection between democracy and regional integration may be deduced from the democratic peace theory: only among liberal democracies is the security dilemma sufficiently reduced to allow the states to surrender a part of their sovereignty, without the fear that today's partner may become tomorrow's enemy. As a result, democracies are relatively more willing to concede voluntarily some sovereignty to a supranational authority—on the condition that all the states involved in the integration are democracies. Even then, the concession of sovereignty will initially be quite limited, the process of integration is likely to be very lengthy and painstaking, and reversals are quite possible.

---

77. Schmitter (1991, p. 114); Hurrell (1995, pp. 68-69).
78. See Schmitter (1991, p. 114); Hurrell (1995, p. 59).
79. Snyder and Ballentine (1996, p. 11 and the citations they cite).

The cornerstone of the liberal approach is democratization, and all the other elements (free market economies, regional institutions and integration, and transnational ties) only ensure warm peace when the regional states are liberal democracies.[80] The great advantage of the liberal strategy is manifested in the empirical record of liberal-democratic states not fighting each other.[81] Even if some substantive issues remain unresolved among liberal democracies, they do not resort to force in order to resolve them but use peaceful means only, and as a result the security dilemma among them declines drastically. Consequently, stable warm peace will be established in a region populated by liberal democracies. Indeed, a liberal-democratic Western Europe has succeeded to establish a warm peace among its regional states in the post-World War II era (see below).

The shortcoming of this approach is the demanding political and socio-economic prerequisites for successful democratization[82] while, for this strategy to work, all the major regional states have to become stable liberal democracies. A major precondition for a stable democracy is the existence of a strong state in the sense defined above.[83] Thus, one of the obstacles to successful democratization and the emergence of a stable democracy is the presence of an intense ethnic conflict in divided societies.[84] Yet, these are precisely the places where the supposedly pacifying effects of democratization are most needed, not only because of the domestic ethnic conflicts, but also because of the close relations between such conflicts and regional conflicts due to the spread of ethnic groups across existing borders in many regions, especially in the Third World and the Balkans.[85]

Another major problem with the liberalization strategy is that as noted, in the short term democratization may increase domestic

---

80. On the liberal school in international relations, see Nye (1988), Keohane (1989), Baldwin (1993), Zacher and Matthew (1995), Doyle (1997), and Moravcsik (1997).

81. For explanations and critiques, see Russett (1993); Doyle (1997), part 2; and Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1996).

82. See Huntington (1991). For a recent review of the research on the political and socio-economic conditions for democracy and on how states become democracies, see Shin (1994).

83. Rothstein (1992); Ayoob (1995, p. 195).

84. For an overview, see Diamond and Plattner (1994), p. xiv.

85. See Diamond and Plattner (1994, p. xxviii); and Ayoob (1995).

instability and provide insecure elites with incentives to pursue the scapegoat strategy by initiating diversionary wars against their neighbors. Indeed, Mansfield and Snyder (1996) show that at least until all the regional states become full-blown liberal democracies, the process of democratization itself may encourage the use of force and thus aggravate regional conflicts. Elites left over from the old regime compete over political power among themselves and with new democratic elites. One of the major strategies available to all these elites for gaining mass support is appealing to nationalist feelings. Once mass support for this strategy is mobilized, leaders have a hard time controlling it in democratizing states which tend to lack effective institutions. A nationalist public and belligerent pressure-groups may push for a militant policy and constrain the freedom of maneuver of foreign policy elites. Especially bellicose are interest groups from the old regime that benefit from imperialism, military expansion and war (Snyder and Mansfield 1996, pp. 303, 315-331).

Democratization can increase the identification of citizens with their state and thus strengthen regional states in the long run. However, a related negative effect of democratization in the short term is that in fragmented societies, notably in Africa and some other parts of the Third World and the Balkans, it may not solve social cleavages but may rather exacerbate existing ethnic problems,[86] and even embolden ethnic minorities to oppose openly their national boundaries and seek self-determination and secession.[87] One major route to democratization is federalism—decentralization of political power along territorial lines. In weak states, a loose federal system may reinforce separatist forces by guaranteeing them assets they can employ for the secessionist cause, such as local police forces and government revenues.[88]

In other cases, democratization may weaken moderate/status quo regimes and elites which are the key to regional peace processes, and make it more difficult for them to make concessions to long-time adversaries. Through an appeal to nationalist and religious

---

86. For a specification of the conditions under which this may happen, see De Nevers (1993). For a study that shows the de-stabilizing effects of political and economic liberalization in war-shattered states, see Paris (1997).

87. Ayoob (1995), p. 182; Chipman (1993); Holsti (1996); and Kaplan (2000).

88. Holsti (1996, pp. 184-85).

emotions, a domestic opposition may use these concessions against the moderate elites and undermine their political base of support. Democratization may also bring to power radical forces which oppose regional reconciliation, for example, Fundamentalist Islamic forces in the Middle East.

Thus, democratization may bring about the disintegration of the regional states or the intensification of ethnic and regional conflicts or both. If there is a stark choice between maintaining the territorial integrity of the state and democratization, state elites are bound to prefer the former over the latter.[89] At the same time the historical record shows that in the absence of democratization, the other liberal prescriptions such as economic interdependence, free trade and regional institutions, may not be sufficient by themselves to ensure regional peace (Mearsheimer 1990, 1995).

Thus, I argue that in the absence of a minimum extent of a state-to-nation symmetry and of strong and coherent states, liberalization may not enhance peace and may even destabilize the region, at least for the short-run. A minimal extent of successful state-building and nation-building is required in order to make possible the pacifying effects of integration based on the compatibility of liberal states.

Thus, the major challenge presented by the liberalization strategy is how to dampen the negative effects that the democratization process creates in the short term, before arriving at stable liberal democracies and warm peace in the longer term. In addition to a prerequisite of certain degree of successful state-building and nation-building, one possibility for solving this dilemma is by combining the liberalization strategy with the international strategy of great power involvement. The great power hegemon or a concert of powers may then prevent regional wars and maintain cold peace, and thus allow the liberalization process to develop and ripen into warm peace. This was indeed the road to peace in post-1945 Western Europe.

---

89. Ayoob (1995), pp. 182-184. Ayoob (1995, p. 182) cites Weiner's observation that even in India, the most consistently democratic major Third World state, "if need be, the center would exercise all the force at its command to prevent secession even if it meant a suspension of democratic rights." Ayoob adds that the events of the recent years in Punjab and Kashmir show the validity of this argument.

Post-1945 Western Europe: Domestic Liberalization >
Transcending the state-to-nation problem by Regional
Integration > Transition from War to Warm Peace

The Integration Strategy's Effects > Warm peace

In comparison with South America, Europe was both much more
of a war-zone until World War II and had suffered from many
more state-to-nation problems than the New World. Europe was
the major war-zone in the international system until 1945. Most
great powers were European and competed among themselves for
power, hegemony, security and influence on the continent and for
overseas colonies. Yet, the state-to-nation asymmetry affected many
of the key rivalries and armed conflicts on the continent during the
19th and 20th centuries, including the two world wars, notably
the wars for German and Italian unifications, the competing natio-
nalist-irredentist claims of Germany and France vis-a-vis Elzes-
Lauren, Pan-Slavic aspirations and struggles for self-determination
in Eastern Europe and the Balkans leading to World War I, and
German demands for national unification in Central and Eastern
Europe producing tense crises before World War II.

The deportation of millions of Germans from Eastern Europe
and the imposed division of Germany and Soviet control over
Eastern Europe following World War II helped to reduce or at
least to manage the national, especially the German, problem on
the continent, although the continuos division also meant that this
problem was not fully resolved. Western Europe did not focus,
however, on direct conflict resolution of state-to-nation problems,
even if some of these issues were addressed successfully. Western
Europe transcended the state-to-nation issues through regional
integration which generated warm peace.

The first major Western European supranational institution
was the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951
by the initiative of then French foreign minister, Robert Schuman,
with the explicit goal of limiting the independent war-making
ability of the Western European states, most notably the former
arch-enemies France and Germany and only a secondary goal was
to contribute to economic welfare.[90] Thus, he stated that "the

---

90. H. Wyatt-Walter (1997), p. 19.

French Government proposes to put the whole of the Franco-German coal and steel production under a joint High Authority, in an organization which is open for the other European countries to enter... The solidarity between the two countries established by joint production will show that a war between France and Germany becomes not only unthinkable but materially impossible" (cited in Russett and Starr 1992, p. 379). One of the major motivations for the Schuman's initiative was the worsening Franco-German relations at the time, mainly due to the Saar problem.[91] The Saar was economically linked to France and politically autonomous from Germany, but the latter refused to recognize its separation from the Federal Republic. The French were particularly anxious about the progress of German economic and political revival and the calls for German rearmament. Schuman's idea was not so much to focus directly on addressing the bilateral issues in conflict between France and Germany, but rather to transcend them by a reconciliation of Germany within a transformed European framework. Indeed, the integration of coal and steel made possible new relations between France and Germany and gave France the leading role in the building of a European Community, the driving force of which was going to be Franco-German.[92] More specifically, in the context of integration it is easier for democracies to transcend territorial issues. Thus, France returned the Saar region to Germany following the outcome in a referendum in which most of the region's population expressed its will to return to Germany.

The next major step of Western European integration was the establishment of the Common Market or the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, later transformed into the European Community (EC). This institution had broad supranational authority, notably to eliminate barriers to trade within the community and to make possible a free movement of capital and people among the member states, thus fulfilling Jean Monnet's vision of binding the economies and eventually the people of Western Europe inex-

---

91. See the discussion in Gerbet (1996, esp. pp. 66-70).
92. The new regional context also made it much easier to resolve the Saar problem peacefully. The Saar was eventually linked both politically and economically with the Federal Republic following a referendum, in which 67% of the voters opted for Germany. On the Saar Conflict, see Freymond (1957), and Hannuum (1990), pp. 394-400.

tricably by economic union, making war unthinkable (Russett and Starr 1992, p. 379).[93] After a slow-down in the integration process between 1967 and 1985, it regained powerful momentum with the successful negotiation and ratification of the Single European Act in the mid-1980s.[94]

Beyond a certain point of stabilization, a warm peace among liberal democracies should stand on its own. Thus, even though the US presence is still very important for the security of the Western European states (Art 1996), the present study (as opposed to realist predictions)[95] does not expect that the potential US military disengagement from Europe or at least a reduction in its presence following the disappearance of the Soviet threat will dramatically affect the warm peace in the region. On the contrary, the tendency in recent years, in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, has been the reinforcement of the Western European warm peace and the deepening of regional integration. This tendency is manifested in the December 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the creation of a single currency—the Euro—in 1999, the agreement to enlarge the Western European Union (WEU), the Schengen Group of eight (originally five) countries attempting to move more rapidly toward common policies on policing and border controls, and the Franco-German "Eurocorps" with its stated aspirations to create the nucleus for a future European army.

Indeed, following NATO air war over Kosovo, the European Union decided in late 1999 to construct its own European security force of 60,000 troops.[96] Thus the Kosovo conflict demonstrated the dual face of European security in the post-Cold War period. On the one hand, it showed the European military inferiority in

---

93. For a succinct analysis of the West European integration within a broader European and international context, see Wallace (1995). Jean Monnet, a French official, was a leading advocate and founding father of Western European integration in the early 1950s.

94. For an extended analysis of the recent stages of the evolution of European integration, including the Act and its effects, see Keohane and Hoffmann (1991) and Wallace (1995).

95. See Mearsheimer (1990); Sheetz (1996).

96. Joseph Fitchett, "EU completes plan for own forces." *International Herald Tribune*, Dec. 10, 1999, p. 4; and Craig Whitney, "Europe's mobile forces: an uncertain factor for U.S. strategists." *International Herald Tribune*, Dec. 13, 1999, p. 5.

relation to the US and the great military dependence of the Europeans on the US for coping with external threats of spreading instability related to ethnic conflicts such as those in the Balkans. At the same time, the Kosovo crisis exerted pressure on the Europeans to further upgrade their security cooperation, even if it is still questionable how fast and how effectively they will implement their new commitment toward increased integration in the security field.

The Conditions for the strategy's effectiveness: Liberalization Under US Hegemony

The effectiveness of the integration strategy has been due to the liberalization process in all the key states of Western Europe and due to US hegemony, which was crucial especially in the early stages of the transition from war to warm peace.

The main historical example of the influence of liberal democracy on the success of regional integration and the emergence of warm peace among liberal states is the warm West European peace established in the aftermath of World War II. Such a warm peace could not have been established without the major Western European states being liberal democracies, with West Germany undergoing a forced democratization during the allied occupation. Indeed, the level of supranational integration has remained limited in all non-democratic regions outside of the liberal-democratic Western Europe. Although US hegemony over the region has been crucial for the initial establishment of peace in Western Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was unable by itself to produce a normal, let alone a warm peace.[97]

The initial post-World War II Western European peace was indeed made possible by the US pacifying role as a benign

---

97. Kupchan (1998) offers an alternative explanation to Western European integration focusing on the relative symmetry of power among W. European states leading to greater reliance on consensual governance. He argues that this relative symmetry explains the greater extent of institutionalization than in N. America and E. Asia. He overlooks the crucial role of liberal compatibility which explains why in other relatively symmetrical regions such as the Middle East, Balkans and S. America regional integration did not develop as successfully as in Europe.

hegemon,[98] which was in turn made possible by the common Soviet threat to the US and to Western Europe.[99] Without the conducive international factor of US leadership, peace among the West European states might not have developed, as French-German relations in the late 1940s-early 1950s might suggest.

In the late 1940s these relations were close to a cold war. Immediately following the war, France's greatest fear was that a resurgent Germany would once again challenge the legitimacy of the political and territorial order in Europe. Such a danger was to be prevented by the dismemberment of Germany, its demilitarization and French control over the Rhine. Moreover, the French demanded control over German resources, especially its production of coal and steel.[100] Yet, the dynamics of the Cold War and its own weakness forced France to change direction in terms of its "German" policy. This did not mean, however, that the French attitude towards Germany changed abruptly. When it became clear that France could no longer afford attempts to balance, or contain, Germany, other options were developed.

The combined effect of US hegemony and the common Soviet threat produced a transition in 1950 from cold war, in which France tried to dismember Germany and keep it weak and powerless to cold peace, in which the two states accepted each other's existence and reached formal agreements, but still had some substantive conflicts to resolve and there was still a high extent of mutual insecurity.

Thus, in 1954 France did not join the European Defense Community, which excluded the US and Britain, because in that framework France would have been left essentially alone with its former archenemy.[101] In contrast, US and Britain's membership in NATO provided guarantes against potential German aggression.

---

98. See Hurrell (1995), p. 48; Joffe (1984) citing also Nerlich (1979), p. 88.
99. See Lundestad (1990), p. 57; Gaddis (1992), pp. 26-27; Buzan (1991), pp. 220-21; Wallace (1995). On the common Soviet threat as a unifying factor for West Germany and its European neighbors, see Gerbet (1996, p. 58).
100. See Geraud (1947), p. 33. On De Gaule's demands regarding the Rhine as the French border, see Freymond (1960), p. 6.
101. See Joffe (1984), pp. 69-73 and (1987), ch. 5. See also Gerbet (1996, pp. 72-75) and Gillingham (1991, p. 250).

On the whole, the US has played a crucial role in regional conflict reduction in Western Europe by helping to reassure West Germany and its neighbors of each other's peaceful intentions, thus reducing the regional security dilemma in a once volatile region. Since the US took upon its shoulders the role of security provider to the Europeans, they did not have to take care of their security and that weakened drastically the security dilemma among them and made possible a separation between high politics and low politics. The Europeans could focus on the economic dimension, more precisely on mutual or absolute gains in this domain, while the US security umbrella weakened the concern about relative gains among them.[102]

The international factor of US hegemony was insufficient by itself to produce the warm peace that has gradually emerged in Western Europe since the late 1950s. The liberal democratic nature of the West European states was necessary to upgrade the cold peace and turn it into the warm peace of the European Community and the European Union through the strategy of regional integration.

Accordingly, the domestic liberalization in formerly authoritarian Western European states, especially in West Germany, in the post-World War II era was critical for the evolution of the warm peace by permanently removing the traditional causes of war on the continent.[103] The American security umbrella facilitated this evolution and allowed it to take place. Moreover, the US induced the democratization and social reform process in West Germany in the immediate aftermath of World War II.[104] But the socio-economic prerequisites for democracy had to be present in West Germany (and also in Italy) for democratization to succeed. The US also spurred European integration by direct encouragement and pressure (Beloff 1963, p. 28; Treverton 1992, ch. 4; Hurrell 1995, p. 48; Ikenberry 1989, pp. 388-89; Gerbet 1996, p. 60), but for high-level integration to be successful, economic and also political compatibility were necessary. Indeed, a key prerequisite for joining the EU is a functioning democracy.

---

102. On relative vs. absolute gains, see Grieco (1998), and on the competing neorealist and neoliberal views on this question se Baldwin, ed. (1993).
103. See Van Evera (1993), esp. pp. 206-211; Buzan et al. (1990), pp. 107-115.
104. See Smith (1994).

General De Gaulle and Mrs. Thatcher have shown that there can be powerful opposition to integration even among democracies. Yet, it is difficult to imagine the regional integration in Western Europe without the factor of liberal democracy, which reduced mutual fears to the point of making the regional states willing to give up a part of their sovereignty and set up supra-national institutions. These, in turn, have helped to build institutionalized procedures for peaceful conflict resolution. Such developments have conspired to make a return to violent conflict in Western Europe unthinkable.

The Logic of An Integrated-Gradual Approach

There is a trade-off between the regional and the international strategies for advancing regional peace. While the regional/domestic strategies are more desirable than the international one in that they are conducive to higher levels of regional peace, they are less feasible, as nation-to-state problems are hard to resolve and liberalization depends on demanding prerequisites. In contrast, the international strategy is more feasible (to the extent that the necessary international conditions are present), but this mechanism is unable by itself to go beyond cold peace and produce higher levels of peace. Yet, as noted, the international strategy may fulfill an important role when combined with the liberalization strategy for achieving warm peace. The two regional/domestic strategies are also distinctive and there are trade-offs and contradictions between them, notably with regard to strengthening or democratizing existing states and also concerning the role of governments versus transnational actors in the peacemaking process. The conflict resolution/statist approach focuses on maintaining the norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. In contrast, the liberalization strategy acknowledges the necessity to subordinate this traditional international society norm to emerging transnational norms of democratization and human rights, which are seen as the most effective guarantees of a lasting peace.[105]

While the three levels of peace have been described as analytically distinct, they may also be regarded as successive stages in a

---

105. See Baker (1996), pp. 563-571.

regional peace process, with each stage conducive to the next one. Thus, great power involvement (either in the form of concert or hegemony) is conducive to a cold regional peace in which the substantive issues in conflict and the problems of regional legitimacy have been moderated or reduced, but are still far from being fully resolved. This conflict reduction may strengthen the regional states at the expense of pan- and sub-national forces because of two major developments. The first one is that the aid provided by the great powers as an inducement for participation in the peace process increases the resources at the disposal of the local states which can use them for state-building. The aid will also increase the states' ability and willingness to prevail over domestic/secessionists and external pan-national challenges to their states by both sticks and carrots. The external aid will also increase the support of domestic constituencies in the regional peace process due to the economic benefits associated with it. Similarly, the growing stability in the region will also attract new investments and may bring about an economic boom and thus broadening the domestic coalitions supporting accommodation.

The second development is the decline in the political power and popular appeal of revisionists/nationalists as the peace process progresses and various national problems (related to territorial claims) are reduced and the sense of mutual security is rising under the reassuring great power umbrella, which also contains the power of the revisionist states. Thus, nationalist forces inside the states, which are taking part in the peace process, are marginalized and their power to obstruct peace processes is declining because the external enemies are less threatening and the substantive components of the conflict are in the process of being reduced. For example, as refugees are resettled, there is a decline in the support for guerrilla or terrorist organizations, which have challenged state coherence in the region; freedom of access to holy nationalist/religious sites reduces the claim to control them exclusively. Growing segments of the publics see the issues in a more pragmatic light as security and economic state interests rather than as emotionally-laden nationalist symbols on which compromise in neither feasible nor desirable. This progress may encourage and allow the local elites to show the necessary flexibility in order to proceed toward the resolution of the disputed state-to-nation issues and their terri-

torial manifestations, and thus to allow the establishment of normal peace.

This level of peace is, in turn, conducive to a domestic liberalization of the regional states. As a recent study shows, democratization in Scandinavia and North America was preceded by the achievement of normal peace which quelled the rivalry among the states for regional hegemony.[106] International threats reinforce the power of anti-democratic forces in the domestic politics of states involved in protracted conflict. The anti-democratic elements controlling the state use the external threats to justify the limits to political freedom inside the state supposedly in order to not undermine the internal unity vis-a-vis the external enemy.[107] In contrast, a moderation in the level of external threats reduces both the necessity, and the pretext, for the repression of democratic opposition.[108] Such an environment is also conducive to a growing trust among the regional states, allowing for the establishment of regional institutions and the development of transnational relations and thus the evolution of warm peace.

I illustrate how the idea of a gradual progress toward a warm peace can be implemented, for example, in the Middle East, using successively all three peacemaking strategies. However, such an implementation is going to be an uphill battle because there are still strong forces which increase the state-to-nation asymmetry in the region: nationalist/irredentist on both sides advancing competing claims over boundaries and territories but, in fact, reinforcing the political appeal of each other; Israeli settlers in the occupied territories and their supporters; Palestinians refugees claiming the right of return; and a major nationalist struggle over the future of Jerusalem.

At the first stage, the US can help in resolving the Palestinian problem—a major source of instability in the region—by brokering a negotiated agreement on the establishment of a Palestinian state. Such a hegemonic-brokered settlement may produce only a cold peace. Yet, a clear-cut political separation between the two parties (Israel and the Palestinians) is likely to reduce the points of

---

106. See Thompson (1996).
107. This is based on the logic of the scapegoat or diversionary theory discussed above.
108. See Gurr (1988).

potential clash among them. American security guarantees and reassurances to both sides can diminish their mutual fears and security dilemmas. Over time a normal peace may evolve to the extent that the demarcation of recognized boundaries and the mutual recognition will confer legitimacy on each state by the public of the other side. Having a state of their own will increase the Palestinian stake in the status-quo (due to fears of what they can lose if they behave aggressively) and reduce the appeal of the revisionist—irredentist forces, leading, in turn, to a reciprocal decline in the power of the revisionists inside Israel. The fulfillment of the national aspirations of the Palestinians is likely also to diminish the power of radical Pan-Arabism since fighting for the stateless Palestinians has ostensibly been one of its main causes.

The Palestinian state, for its part, will have to disarm the remaining revisionist forces and thus establish a strong and coherent state, which has a monopoly of the means of violence inside its territory. Such a monopoly will reduce terrorist activities against Israelis and thus increase their support of the peace process. The Palestinian state will also have to build effective institutions and create the capacity to deliver social and economic services and thus increase its domestic legitimacy. External powers will be able to play an important role in providing aid for these purposes: both financial and know-how. But the success of this institution-building will eventually depend on the political and economic system of the Palestinians. Such a success is likely to help to absorb many Palestinian refugees in their own state and thus moderate their claim for exercising the right of return to Israel. Addressing the refugee problem will remove a major revisionist source of regional instability. In the early stages of the state-building, an immediate full-blown democratization might be too premature and even have destabilizing consequences. However, as soon as the institution-building reaches a certain level of maturity, liberalization, encouraged by the hegemon, may produce the conditions for a warm liberal peace, including some degree of economic integration.

Conclusions

This study establishes linkages between three mechanisms for regional peacemaking and three types of peace. Not less important,

the article specifies the conditions necessary for the effectiveness of these strategies. One of the mechanisms is international (great power intervention in the form of either a great power concert or hegemony) and two are regional/domestic (regional conflict resolution and regional integration). The regional/domestic strategies are more desirable because they can bring about higher levels of peace, namely, normal peace (by conflict resolution among strong and coherent states) or warm peace (through integration but only if it takes place among liberal democracies). The international strategy can produce, at best, only a relatively low level of peace, that is, cold peace. Yet, the international mechanism can be useful to the extent that the regional strategies are not feasible, while the international one is available. In some important regions this might be the case. For example, the Middle East is not ready yet for a Western European style of regional integration leading to warm peace due to the weakness of all the liberal factors in the region (especially the absence of liberal democracies, but also international institutions, economic interdependence or transnational ties); thus, former Israeli prime minister Peres' idea of a "New Middle East" (1993) is premature. Moreover, in the short term democratization in the Middle East can be destabilizing because it may weaken status quo elites and regimes and bring to power radical Islamic Fundamentalist forces. Thus, it might also be undesirable for the purpose of promoting regional peace.

At the same time, despite some considerable progress made in the Middle East peace process during the 1990s, the regional actors have a hard time resolving the regional state-to-nation problems on their own. There are still powerful nationalist-irredentist forces both in Israel and in the Arab world. There are also strong sub-national forces in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq which challenge the stability of these states and make them incoherent. In such states the regimes face powerful nationalist and ethnic opposition, which constrains their ability to resolve conflicts fully and to establish normal peace with ex-enemies. Yet so long as US hegemony over the region prevails, there is a window of opportunity for the establishment of a regional cold peace, which may, in turn, facilitate progress toward normal peace, that is, settling the substantive issues in dispute between Israel and the Arabs like sovereignty, boundaries, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem

and other territorial questions. Such a resolution will enhance the level of regional legitimacy, strengthen local states, and reduce markedly the danger of war. Resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem, for example, will diminish the reservoir of new recruits to guerrilla and terrorist organizations and thus reduce Israeli security fears and increase Israel's willingness to make concessions. A comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian problem will reduce the opposition in the Arab world to the establishment of normal peace with Israel. In the longer term, the enhancement of regional legitimacy and normal peace is favorable for the evolution over time of democratization and economic interdependence in the region, and thus for a gradual emergence of a warm peace in a "New Middle East," even if very slowly and with many ups and downs.

The case of South America shows that the presence of relatively strong/coherent states, and a relatively high degree of regional state-to-nation compatibility, enables a successful process of conflict resolution generating a normal peace, even if not a perfect one. Democratization under these conditions may bring about a more successful regional integration than among authoritarian states, and thus a gradual emergence of a warm peace. The Western European case shows that democracy is indeed the key for effective integration and the emergence of warm peace. But it also shows that a benign hegemony has to play a crucial role in the early stages in the evolution of warm peace, in facilitating the transition of former arch-enemies like France and Germany to peaceful and cooperative relations. An intensive engagement by a hegemon was much more needed in Europe in the post-World War II period than in 20th century South America so as to make possible a dramatic transition from a long history of hot and cold wars to a warm peace, with only a relatively brief intermediate stage of normal peace. In South America, in contrast, the evolution of normal peace proceeded slowly over a long period of time, encompassing almost the whole 20th century. In the Middle East, however, due to the lengthy period of hot and cold wars and the severe problems of state-to-nation, an intensive hegemonic involvement is essential to sustain a cold peace, which should make possible the evolution of the conditions for a normal peace. Yet, both the South American and the West European cases show that beyond a certain point it is up to the regional parties, rather than to global

powers, to move the relations to higher levels of a normal, let alone a warm, peace.

Bibliography

Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (1998). *Pluralistic security communities.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Art, Robert J. (1996). "Why Western Europe needs the United States and NATO." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 111, no. 1.

Ayoob, Mohammed (1995). *The Third World Security Predicament.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Baker, P. H. (1996). "Conflict resolution versus democratic governance: divergent paths to peace?" In C. A. Crocker & F. O. Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict.* Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 563-571.

Baldwin, David A., ed. (1993). *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Barrington, Lowell W. (1997). "'Nation' and 'nationalism': The misuse of key concepts in political science." *PS: Political Science&Politics.* December, pp. 712-716.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., O. Elgstrom, M. Jerneck, and A. Kacowics, eds., *Stable Peace* (forthcoming, 2000).

Beloff, Max (1963). *The United States and the Unity of Europe.* London: Faber and Faber.

Ben-Dor, Gabriel (1983). *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State.* New York: Praeger.

Ben-Zvi, Abraham (1993). *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Boulding, Kenneth A. (1978). *Stable Peace.* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Brown, Michael, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. (1995). *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

——— et al. (1996). *Debating the Democratic Peace.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bull, Hedley (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Buzan, Barry (1991). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era.* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2d ed.

———, Kelstup, M., Lemaitre, P., Tromer, E., and Waever, O. (1990). *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the post-Cold War Era.* London: Pinter.

———, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (1993). *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Calvert, P. (1969). *Latin America: Internal Conflict and International Peace.* N.Y.: St. Martin Press.

Carment, David (1993). "The international dimension of ethnic conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 2, pp. 137-50.

Carmnet, David and Patrick James, eds. (1997). *Wars in the Midst of Peace.* Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburg Press.

Child, Jack (1985). *Geopolitics and Conflict within South America: Quarrels among Neighbors.* New York: Praeger.

Chipman, John (1993). "Managing the politics of parochialism." In Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Connor, Walker (1994). "Terminological chaos ("A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a..."). In W. Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Connor, W. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Craig, Gordon and George Alexander (1995). *Force and Statecraft.* New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd. edition.

D'Agostino, Thomas J. (1997). "Latin American Politics," in Richard S. Hillman, ed., *Understanding Contemporary Latin America (*Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).

David, Steven R. (1991). "Explaining Third World Alignment." *World Politics,* 43: 233-56.

———, (1992-93). "Why the Third World still Matters." *International Security,* 17, pp. 127-59.

De Nevers, Renee (1993). "Democratization and ethnic conflict." In Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Deutsch, Karl et al. (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds. (1994). *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Doran, Charles F. (1992). "The globalist-regionalist debate." In R. J., Schrader, ed., *Intervention into the 1990s,* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Doyle, Michael (1997). *Ways of War and Peace.* New York: Norton.

Frankel, Benjamin, ed. (1996). *Realism: Restatement and Renewal.* London: Frank Cass.

Fraser, Cleveland (1997). "International Relations," in Richard S. Hillman, ed., *Understanding Contemporary Latin America* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).

Freymond, Jacques (1960). *The Saar Conflict 1945-1955*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Gaddis, J. L. (1992). "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the future." In M. J. Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Gallo, E. (1993). "Society and politics, l880-1916." In L. Bethell, ed., *Argentina since Independence*. Cambridge UP, pp. 79-111.

Galtung, Johan (1975). *Essays in Peace Research.* Volume 1. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.

Geraud, Andre (1947). "Can France again be a great power?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 26 (1), October.

Gerbet, Pierre (1996). "European integration as an instrument of French foreign policy." In Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, eds., *The United States and the Integration of Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Gerges, Fawaz A. (May-June 1995). "Egyptian-Israeli relations turn sour." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 69-78.

Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Spring 1997). "Come home, America: The strategy of restraint in the face of temptation." *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 5-48.

Gillingham, J. (1991). *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*. Cambridge UP.

Gurr, Ted Robert (1988). "War, revolution and the growth of the coercive state." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 45-65.

Haas, Ernst B. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces.* Stanford: Sanford Univ. Press.

———, (1964). *Beyond the Nation State.* Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.

Herrmann, Richard (1994). "Coercive diplomacy and the crisis over Kuwait, 1990-91." In Alexander George and William Simons, eds., (1994). *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.* Boulder: Westview Press, 2nd. edition.

Holsti, K. J. (1996). *War, The State, and the State of War.* Cambridge: Cambidge Univ. Press.

Hopmann, Terrence, P. (1994). *Resolving International Conflicts: The Negotiation Process.* Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press.

Hudson, Michael C. (Summer 1996). "To play the hegemon: fifty years of US policy toward the Middle East." *Middle East Journal*, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 329-343.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Hurell, Andrew (1995). "Regionalism in theoretical perspective." In Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-73.

Ikenberry, John G. (1989). "Rethinking the origins of American hegemony." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 104 (3): 375-400.

Indyk, Martin (1992). "The postwar balance of power in the Middle East," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith, eds., *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War* (Lanham, Md.: Madison, 1992).

Ireland, Gordon (1938). *Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.

Jackson, Robert H. (1990). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jervis, Robert (January 1978). "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics,* vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 167-214.

Job, Brian, ed. (1992). *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States.* Boulder: Rienner.

Joffe, Josef (1984). "Europe's American pacifier." *Foreign Policy*, pp. 64-82.

———, (1987). *The limited partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burden of Alliance.* Cambridge. MA: Ballinger.

Kacowicz, Arie M. (1994). *Peaceful Territorial Change*. Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press.

———, (1996). "The South American Zone of Peace, l883-1996." *Peace Papers,* 7, The Harry, S. Truman Research Institute, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

———, (1998). *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective*. Albany: SUNY.

Kagan, Korina (2000). *Great Power Spheres of Influence*. Ph. Dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Kaplan, Robert D. (2000). *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Random House.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996). "Regionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 31 (2), pp. 123-159.

Keohane, Robert (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———, (1989). *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

———, ed. (1986). *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

———, and Stanley Hoffmann (1990). "Conclusions: community politics and institutional change." In William Wallace, ed., *The Dynamics of European Integration* (London: pinter).

———, and ———, eds. (1991). *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*. Boulder: Westview press.

Kriesberg, Louis (1992). *International Conflict Resolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kupchan, Charles (1998). "After Pax Americana: benign power, regional integration, and the sources of a stable multipolarity," *International Security,* 23 (2).

Kupchan, Charles and Clifford Kupchan (Summer 199l). "Concerts, collective security, and the future of Europe," *International Security* 16, pp. 114-161.

Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild, eds. (1998). *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Layne, Christopher (Spring 1993). "The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise." *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 5-51.

Lebow, Richard Ned (198l). *Between Peace and War: the Nature of International Crisis*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. (1995). *International Relations Theory and The End of the Cold War.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Levy, Jack (1989). "The diversionary theory of war: a critique." In M. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies.* Boston: Unwin Hyman.

———, (1991). "Long cycles, hegemonic transitions, and the long peace." In *The Long Postwar Peace*, edited by C. Kegley, pp. 147-176. New York: Harper Collins.

Lieber, Robert J. (1995). "The American role in a regional security regime," in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Regional Security Regimes: Israel and its Neighbors.* Albany, New York: SUNY, pp. 59-80.

Lindberg, Leon N. (1963). *The Political Dynamics of European Ecomonic Integration.* Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.

———, and Stuart Scheingold, eds. (1971). *Regional Integration: Theory and Research.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.

Lundestad, G. (1990). *The American "Empire" and other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Lynch, J. (1993). "From independence to national organization." In L. Bethell, ed., *Argentina since Independence.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Mandell, Brian S. (1990). "Anatomy of a confidence building regime: Egyptian-Israeli security co-operation, 1973-1979" *International Journal,* 45 (2): 202-223.

———, and Tomlin, Brian W. (1991). "Mediation in the Development of Norms to Manage Conflict: Kissinger in the Middle East" *Journal of Peace Research,* 28 (1):43-55.

Mandel, Robert (1980). "Roots of the modern interstate border dispute," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 24, no. 3.

Mansfield Edward D. and Jack Snyder (1996). "Democratization and the danger of war." In Brown et al.

Mayall, James (1990). *Nationalism and International Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Mearsheimer, John (Summer 1990). "Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War" *International Security,* vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 5-56.

———, "The false promise of international institutions." (1995). In Brown, Michael, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds.,

The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Merquior, J.G. (1987). "Patterns of state building in Brazil and Argentina." In J. A. Hall, ed., *States in History*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 264-288.

Miller, Benjamin (1992). "A 'New World Order': from balancing to hegemony, concert or collective security?" *International Interactions,* 18: 1-33.

———, (October 1994). "Explaining the emergence of great power concerts." *Review of International Studies.*

———, (1995). *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

———, (Spring 1996). "Competing Realist perspectives on Great Power crisis behavior." *Security Studies,* 5 (Special issue on Realism).

———, (March 1997). "The Great Powers and Regional Peacemaking: Patterns in the Middle East and Beyond." In Zeev Maoz, ed., Special Issue of the *Journal of Strategic Studies* on Regional Security in the Middle East, vol. 20, no. 1.

Miller, Benjamin (1998a). "Theory of Regional War and Peace." Boston: APSA.

Miller, Benjamin (1998b). "How to Advance Regional Peace: Competing Strategies for Peacemaking." Paper presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference, Vienna.

Miller, Benjamin (1998c). "The Logic of US Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era." *Contemporary Security Policy,* 19, 3.

Miller, Benjamin (1999a). "Explaining Regional War-Propensity: The Middle East in a Comparative Perspective." Paper presented at the meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C.

Miller, Benjamin (1999b). "Between War and Peace: Systemic Effects on the Transition of the Middle East and the Balkans from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War era." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.

Miller, Benjamin (1999c). "The Sources of Regional War and Peace: Integrating the Effects of Nationalism, Liberalism and the International System." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.

Miller, Benjamin (1999d). "The global sources of regional transitions from war to peace: The case of the Middle East." *Working Papers*

of the Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Miller, Benjamin (2000a). "When Regions Become Peaceful: Explaining Transitions from War to Peace." Paper presented at the ISA, Los Angeles.

Miller, Benjamin (2000b). "Explaining Variations in Regional Peace: Three Strategies for Peacemaking", *Cooperation and Conflict,* 35 (2): 155-191.

———, forthcoming. "Hot war, cold peace: International-regional synthesis." In Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat, eds., *War in a Changing World*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

———, and Korina Kagan (March 1997). "The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era", *International Studies Quarterly* 41, 51-85.

Mitchell, C.R. (1981). *The Structure of International Conflict*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew (Autumn 1997). "A liberal theory of international politics." *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 513-554.

Nerlich, Uwe (Winter 1979). "Western Europe's relations with the United States." *Daedalus.*

Neumann, Iver B. (January 1994). "A region-building approach to Northern Europe," *Review of International Studies*, 20, 1.

Nye, Joseph S. (1971). *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Boston: Little Brown.

———, (January 1988). "Neorealism and neoliberalism." *World Politics*, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 235-251.

———, (1990). *Bound to Lead*. New York: Basic Books.

Oye, Kenneth ed. (1986). *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Paris, Roland (1997). "Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism." *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 2 (fall), pp. 54-89.

Pastor, Robert (1992). *Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Patchen, Martin (1988). *Resolving Disputes between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation?* Durham: Duke University Press.

Peres, Shimon, with Aori Naori (1993). *The New Middle East.* New York: Henry Holt.

Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross (Winter 1996-97). "Competing visions for U.S. grand strategy," *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 5-53.

Quandt, William (1993). *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rock, Stephen R. (1989). *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective.* Chapel Hill: The University of North carolina Press.

Rosecrance, Richard (1986). *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World.* New York: Basic Books.

Rothstein, Robert L. (1992). "Weak democracy and the prospect for peace and prosperity in the Third World." In Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub, *Resolving Third World Conflicts: Challenges for a New Era.* Washington, D. C.: The US Institute of Peace.

Russett, Bruce M. (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold War World.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Russett, Bruce and Harvey Starr (1992). *World Politics: The Menu for Choice.* New York: Freeman.

Saidman, Stephen M. (1997). "Explaining the international relations of secessionist conflicts: vulnerability versus ethnic ties." *International Organization,* 51, 4, Autumn, pp. 721-53.

Schmitter, Philippe C. (1991). "Change in regime type and progress in international relations." In E. Adler and B. Crawford, eds., *Progress in Postwar International Relations.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Schweller, Randall (1996). "Neorealism's status-quo bias." *Security Studies,* 5 (Special issue on Realism).

Seckinger, R. (1984). *The Brazilian Monarchy and the South American Republics, 1822-1831.* Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press.

Sheetz, Mark (1996). "Is 'security cooperation' an oxymoron? The case of France and Germany." San-Diego: *ISA*, April 16-20.

Shin, Doh Chull (October 1994). "On the third wave of democratization: a synthesis and evaluation of recent theory and research." *World Politics*, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 135-170.

Shumway, N. (1991). *The Invention of Argentina.* Berkeley: California University Press.

Smith, Tony (1994). *America's Mission: The United States and the World-Wide Struggle for Democracy in the 20th Century.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Snyder, Jack (1991). *Myths of Empire.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———, and Karen Ballentine (1996). "Nationalism and the marketplace of ideas." *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 5-40.

Solingen, Etel (1998). *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Stein, Janice G. (1993). "The security dilemma in the Middle East: A prognosis for the decade ahead." In Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen, eds., *The Many Faces of national security in the Arab World.* London: Macmillan, 1993.

Telhami, Shibley (1990). *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Thompson, William R. (1996). "Democracy and peace." *International Organization,* 50: 141-174.

Touval, Saadia (1982). *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Treverton, G. F. (1992). *America, Germany and the Future of Europe.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

Van Evera, Stephen (June 1990). "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 13, no. 2.

———, (1993). "Primed for peace: Europe after the Cold War." In Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Steven E. Miller, eds., (1993). *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace—An International Security Reader.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

———, (1995). "Hypohtheses on Nationalism and War." In Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Steven E. Miller, eds., (1995). *Global Dangers—An International Security Reader.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Vasquez, John A. (1995), "Why do neighbors fight? Proximity, interaction, or territoriality." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 277-293.

Vayrynen, Raimo (1984). "Regional conflict formations: an intractable problem of international relations?" *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 21, no. 4, 337-59.

Wallace, William (1995). "Regionalism in Europe: Model or exception?" In Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Regionalism in World*

Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallensteen, Peter (1991). "Is there a role for third parties in the prevention of nuclear war," In P. Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*. New York: Oxford University Press, vol. II.

Walt, Stephen M. (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———, (Summer 1989). "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing US Grand Strategy," *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 1.

Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.

Wayman, Frank and Paul Diehl, eds. (1994). *Reconstructing Realpolitik.* Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

Weiner, Myron (1987). "Political change: Asia, Africa and the Middle East." In Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Understanding Political Development.* Glenview, Ill: Little Brown.

Wendt, Alexander "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization,* 46, no. 2, pp. 391-425.

Wight, Martin (1973). "The balance of power and international order," in J. Alan ed., *The Bases of International Order*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Wriggins, Howard, ed. (1992). *Dynamics of Regional Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wyatt-Walter, H. (1997). *The European Community and the Security Dilemma 1979-1992.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zacher, Mark W. and Richard A. Matthew (1995). "Liberal international theory: common threads, divergent strands." In Charles W., Kegley, JR., ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Zartman, William, I. and Victor A. Kremenyuk, eds., (1995). *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars*. Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press.

Content