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## **Correlated Poisson Processes with Unobserved Heterogeneity: Estimating the Determinants of Paid and Upaid Leave**

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**Abstract:**

Using linked employer-employee data from the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey 1999-2004, we provide new evidence on how the cost of absence affects labor supply decisions. We use a particular feature of the data by which total absences are divided into three separate categories: sick paid days, other paid days and unpaid days. This division introduces variations in the way workers are compensated for absence (the cost of absence) and allows us to estimate more precisely how variations in such costs affect absenteeism decisions. We find an absence elasticity of  $-0.37$ . We also find unobserved heterogeneity to play different roles for workers and workplaces: some workers are more frequently absent whatever the reason, but paid and unpaid leaves are negatively correlated at the workplace level.

**Keywords:** Absenteeism, Linked Employer-Employee Data, Unobserved Heterogeneity, Count Data Model, Correlated Random Effects

**JEL Classification:** J22, M52

# 1 Introduction

Most measures of absenteeism show that it has risen in recent years.<sup>1</sup> There are also reasons to believe that the cost of absenteeism is increasing for firms, especially as they rely increasingly on teamwork as a form of work organization.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, a major focus of the literature on the determinants of absenteeism is to find what proportion of absences could be avoided and what tools firms can use to prevent absenteeism. To do this, most authors attempt to measure the cost of absences and then proceed to examine how absences respond to changes in its cost.

Two different frameworks are frequently used for such an assessment. The first framework uses natural experiments in which levels of absenteeism are compared before-and-after some policy change in the way workers are compensated for absence, usually for sickness reasons.<sup>3</sup> The other framework treats absence decisions as stemming from the usual consumption-leisure utility maximization model and then proceeds to estimate a structural or reduced-form model of the determinants of absence.

Johansson and Palme (2002) is a prominent example of the first strand of the literature. Using data from the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey (SLLS) and major reforms of Sweden's replacement program for short-term sickness and income taxes, they find significant impact of economic incentives on absences. Henrekson and Persson (2004) use aggregate time-series data from the National Social Insurance Board of Sweden over the 1955-99 period and numerous changes of the compensation level of sick leave to uncover a significant relationship between more generous sick leave policies and levels of absence. Although both

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<sup>1</sup>See Akyeampong (2005) for such an assessment for Canada.

<sup>2</sup>Heywood and Jirjahn (2004) provide some evidence that firms with teams have lower absence rates.

<sup>3</sup>A subset of studies focus on health as a determinants of absence. See for example Ichino and Moretti (2008), Ose (2005) or Vistnes (1997), .

of these studies provide convincing evidence that economic incentives matter, they do not provide details on the magnitude of the impact.

In order to use the second framework, one needs detailed data on the cost of absence including precise information about the firm's leave policy. Whether the absent employee receive his full or part of his wage is in the usually unobserved job contract.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, most studies in this strand of the literature have to rely on data on one or a very small sample of firms where at least part of the relevant information is present. However, relying on such small samples increases the concern that the results are be interpreted as establishment specific.<sup>5</sup> Allen (1981) and Dionne and Dostie (2007) are the only two studies using representative survey data to study this topic.

Allen (1981) starts with the observation that absence can be made costly to employees through decisions on promotions, merit wage increases, layoffs and the availability of sick leave and attendance bonus. Using the 1972-73 Quality of Employment Survey (QES) and the availability of paid sick leave as a direct cost of absence, he finds that if a worker misses 10 days a year, it would take a 21%-28% net wage increase to reduce his annual absence by one day. Interestingly, the unavailability of paid sick leave leads to a bigger response of absences to wage (about twice as large), presumably because absences are more costly in this later case. However, two data problems with Allen (1981)'s results are that absences were measured over a relatively short period of time (two weeks) and, more importantly, the QES does not have any information on the hourly wage rate so that arbitrary assumptions on hours worked are needed to convert yearly income into some measure of wage.

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<sup>4</sup>This cost might even depend on the reason for the absence. But even if the reason is given, it is doubtful that it is reported truthfully in all case.

<sup>5</sup>The numerous examples in this category include Dunn and Youngblood (1986), Barmby, Orme, and Treble (1991), Wilson and Peel (1991), Drago and Wooden (1992), Delgado and Kiesner (1997), Barmby (2002), Kauermann and Ortlieb (2004) and Ichino and Riphahn (2005).

Dionne and Dostie (2007) examine the determinants of absenteeism using the Workplace Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2002 from Statistics Canada. While the WES data is representative and contains adequate information on total days of absence in the past year and hourly wages, Dionne and Dostie (2007) only uses proxies to measure the cost of absence. Building on Allen (1981)'s insights, they assume the cost of absenteeism is usually related to an increased likelihood of being fired or being passed up for promotion. Therefore, they settle on an indicator of the layoff rate and the vacancy rate. These variables are interpreted as indicating the willingness of the workplace to use layoffs as a way to discipline employees. For example, if the vacancy rate is high, the employer might be reluctant to fire employees even if they misbehave. They also include measures of the use of incentive pay in the workplace. The absent worker might be compensated for lost wages due to absence, but it is conceivable that the probability of receiving merit pay, a share of the profits or group incentives will diminish as a result of his absence.

While those proxies work reasonably well in their empirical analysis, it still would be more useful to have access to more direct measures of the cost of absence. The main objective of this paper is to provide new evidence on how the cost of absence affect labor supply decisions. We use linked employer-employee data from the Canadian WES 1999-2004. We use a particular feature of the data by which total absences are divided into three separate categories: sick paid days, other paid days and unpaid days. This division introduces variations in the way workers are compensated for absence (the cost of absence) and allows us to estimate more precisely how variations in such costs affect absenteeism decisions.

We also contribute to the literature on econometric models of linked employer-employee data by estimating simultaneously a Poisson model of the determi-

nants of each type of absence. This is important since it is likely decisions on different types of absence are taken simultaneously. We also take into account both unobserved worker and workplace heterogeneity and even allow these to be correlated across equations. This allows us to determine whether the determinants of absence have the same impact and to examine whether unobserved characteristics play a similar role on different types of absences.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by extending the usual consumption-leisure utility maximization model for comparing the determinants of paid and unpaid absences. Section 3 describes the econometric model that allows workplace and worker unobserved heterogeneity components to be correlated across the three estimated equations. The data is described in Section 4 while the estimation results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Theoretical framework

We use the consumption-leisure choice model to study absenteeism decisions but modify it to explicitly take into account different types of absence. Let  $t^c$  be the contracted number of work hours and  $w$  the wage rate. When, for any imperfection in the labor market, the wage rate is not equal to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and income, the worker may have an incentive to consume more leisure. He may then be absent from work. Some absenteeism may be unavoidable such as sick leaves; other may be more related to pure leisure or other private activities. We are interested in the explicit cost of such choices and on how workplace and job characteristics affect these decisions. For simplicity, we consider two types of absences: paid ( $t^p$ ) and unpaid ( $t^u$ ). Paid absences have less direct costs for the worker. Both types of absence are also subject to a penalty ( $D$ ) for each scheduled work period missed. This penalty

can be a reduction in the probability of receiving a promotion or even an increase in the probability of being dismissed (indirect cost of absence). We assume that:

$$D = D^i(t^i),$$

with

$$D'^i \geq 0, \quad D''^i \leq 0, \quad D^i(0) = 0, \quad i = p, u.$$

Since the worker does not always know the potential penalty cost when he makes his decision, we consider the possibility that  $D^i(t^i)$  can be a random variable. We write  $\tilde{D}^i(t^i)$  when this is the case.

We assume that worker maximizes an expected utility function  $U$  of consumption ( $C$ ) and total leisure time ( $L$ ) when he is making his absence decisions for given contracting hours ( $t^c$ ):

$$EU(\tilde{C}, L; P, F) \tag{1}$$

where  $P$  and  $F$  are respectively a vector of personal characteristics and a vector of firm characteristics and  $E$  is the expectation operator. Writing  $R$  as the individual non-labor income, the budget constraint can be written as:

$$\tilde{C} = R + w(t^c - t^u - (1 - s)t^p) - \tilde{D}^p(t^p) - \tilde{D}^u(t^u) \tag{2}$$

where  $w$  is the wage rate,  $s$  is a variable that takes the value of one if the worker has full leave benefits and less than one otherwise. The penalties variables can be expressed more explicitly by defining  $\tilde{w}^u$  and  $\tilde{w}^p$  as the unit costs of being absent. So we can write  $\tilde{D}^i(t^i) = \tilde{w}^i t^i$  and these costs are random variables

when the decision on  $t^i$  is made. We can write the time constraint as:

$$t - t^c - t^u - t^p - t^\ell = 0$$

where  $t$  represents the total amount of time in the period under consideration and  $t^\ell$  is pure leisure time. So we can write

$$L = t^p + t^u + t^\ell. \quad (3)$$

Substitution of (2) and (3) in (1) yields

$$EU(R + w(t^c - t^u - (1-s)t^p) - \tilde{w}^u t^u - \tilde{w}^p t^p, t^p + t^u + t^\ell)$$

and differentiation with respect to  $t^u$  and  $t^p$  produces the two first-order conditions:

( $t^u$ ):

$$E[U_L - (w + \tilde{w}^u)U_C] = 0 \quad (4)$$

( $t^p$ ):

$$E[U_L - (w(1-s) + \tilde{w}^p)U_C] = 0 \quad (5)$$

where  $U_k$  is the partial derivative of  $U$  with respect to  $k = L, C$ . We write  $H^{uu}, H^{pp}$  for the second derivatives of (4) and (5) respectively and  $H$  for the determinant of the second derivatives of the maximization program. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a global maximum are that  $H^{ii} < 0$  and  $H > 0$ .

From (4) and (5) we observe that the shadow price (or cost) of time for absent workers is function of  $s$ . When  $s = 0$ ,  $t^p$  and  $t^u$  have equivalent shadow price but the shadow price of  $t^p$  decreases as  $s$  increases. In the particular case where full compensation benefits are available ( $s = 1$ ), the cost of absence is



reduced to  $\tilde{w}^p$ . For equivalent penalty function ( $\tilde{w}^i$ ), workers should be absent more frequently in firms where sick leave is full paid and this reason for absence should be observed more frequently. This effect should be even higher when  $E(w^p) \leq E(w^u)$  as we may suspect for sick days in many firms.

From the Appendix, we obtain the following comparative static results. We first observe that  $\frac{\partial t^i}{\partial R} > 0$  when  $L$  is not an inferior good which is a reasonable assumption. We also observe that this positive effect is lower for larger compensation benefits (or larger  $s$ ) and decreases as  $\tilde{w}^i$  decreases. It may even become negative for full compensated absences that are well motivated (when the penalty cost ( $\tilde{w}^i$ ) for absence is low). This income effect is useful for the sign of  $\frac{\partial t^i}{\partial t^c} > 0$ . The reader should not forget that the decision about  $t^c$  is already done when marginal decision are made about  $t^u$  and  $t^p$ . Consequently, in our model, an increase in  $t^c$  is similar to a wealth effect for a given  $w$ .

We also obtain that  $\frac{\partial t^i}{\partial E(w^i)}$  is negative for both types of absence when  $L$  is not an inferior good or when proportional risk aversion is uniformly less than unity. This increase in average penalty effect becomes ambiguous otherwise.<sup>6</sup>

One important effect for the firms is the effect of a change in the wage rate on time absent from work. This effect is ambiguous a priori because income and substitution effects operate in opposite directions. Assuming in a first step the condition of a downward-sloping absenteeism demand curve, a negative sign is obtained for unpaid benefits or when  $s$  equals zero or is sufficiently small for paid benefits. When  $s$  is sufficiently high or equal to one (full paid benefits), the effect is positive when the income effect is positive or when leisure is not an inferior good. But the effect becomes ambiguous for many values of  $s$  and is subject for empirical investigation.

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<sup>6</sup>For the study of labor supply under uncertainty, see Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1987).

The model for  $t^u$  can be summarized as:

$$t^u = t^u \begin{pmatrix} w, & R, & t^c, & E(w^u) \\ (-) & (+) & (+) & (-) \end{pmatrix}$$

when  $L$  is not an inferior good. In the case of  $t^p$ , when  $s$  is presumably equal or close to one, many comparative statics results become ambiguous and even obtain counter intuitive effects.

### 3 Econometric specification

#### 3.1 Basic model

In this model, where there is no unobserved heterogeneity, days of absence can be represented by a Poisson process (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984); Gouriéroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)). In fact, since absences are recorded as non-negative integers, modeling such data with a continuous distribution could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Let  $t_{ijt}$  be the observed number of days of absenteeism for employee  $i$  in firm  $j$  at time  $t$ . The basic model is

$$P(T_{ijt} = t_{ijt} \mid \lambda_{ijt}) = \frac{e^{-\lambda_{ijt}} (\lambda_{ijt})^{t_{ijt}}}{t_{ijt}!}, \quad (6)$$

It is typical to introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the Poisson model in a multiplicative form through  $\lambda_{ijt}$  when we apply the model to a population of heterogeneous individuals and workplaces. We use the following parameterization for  $\lambda_{ijt}$

$$\lambda_{ijt} = \exp(\beta X_{ijt} + \psi_j + \theta_{ij}), \quad (7)$$

where  $X_{ijt}$  is a vector of demographic characteristics.<sup>7</sup> It also includes controls for time, occupation and industry. The additional parameters  $\psi_j$  and  $\theta_{ij}$  capture the impact of unobserved characteristics of the workplace and the worker respectively.<sup>8</sup> These unobserved characteristics are assumed to be orthogonal to other observed characteristics. We assume both workplace and worker unobserved heterogeneity to be normally distributed with mean zero. The variance of  $\psi_j$  ( $\sigma_\psi$ ) is identified by the observation of many workers coming from the same workplace while identification of the variance of  $\theta_{ij}$  ( $\sigma_\theta$ ) is possible by multiple observations of the same worker over time.<sup>9</sup>

Workplace unobserved heterogeneity might proxy for the cost of absence to the workplace when observed heterogeneity is not sufficiently informative. For example, the cost of absence to the firm might be pretty low if substitute workers are easily available and are as productive as regular workers (Allen (1983)). Therefore, the econometrician might observe higher absenteeism than in an otherwise identical firm where such substitute workers are not available. From a statistical point of view, it is necessary to take into account both sources of heterogeneity in order to avoid the problem of spurious regressions due to multiple observations on the same worker over time and the same firm characteristics over its employees. Unobserved heterogeneity at the worker level might represent different preferences or ethic/motivation levels, or unobserved job characteristics like the safety of the work environment.

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<sup>7</sup>Dionne and Dostie (2007) show what parametrization of the utility function yields this empirical specification.

<sup>8</sup>Since we do not observe workers over different jobs, we cannot distinguish between worker (individual) and job unobserved heterogeneity.

<sup>9</sup>Note that this specification is not subject to the usual objection to the Poisson model since the inclusion of firm and worker unobserved heterogeneity allows for overdispersion at both the worker and firm level.

### 3.2 Correlated model

To take into account the possibility that observed and unobserved characteristics could have different impacts on different types of absences, we estimate separate Poisson models for each type of absence, i.e. sick leave, other paid leave and unpaid leave. Doing so, we also allow the workplace and worker unobserved heterogeneity components to be correlated across equations. Estimating the correlation between the different types of absence will be informative as to whether the different types of leave are substitutes or complements.

Specifically, add superscript  $a$  to equation (6) with  $a = 1$  (sick leave),  $= 2$  (other paid leave),  $= 3$  (unpaid leave) so  $T_{ijt}^a \sim \text{Poisson}(\lambda_{ijt}^a)$  with

$$\lambda_{ijt}^a = \exp(\beta^a X_{ijt} + \psi_j^a + \theta_{ij}^a) \quad (8)$$

where

$$\begin{pmatrix} \psi_j^1 \\ \psi_j^2 \\ \psi_j^3 \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{\psi_1} & \sigma_{\psi_{12}} & \sigma_{\psi_{13}} \\ \cdot & \sigma_{\psi_2} & \sigma_{\psi_{23}} \\ \cdot & \cdot & \sigma_{\psi_3} \end{bmatrix} \right) \quad (9)$$

and

$$\begin{pmatrix} \theta_{ij}^1 \\ \theta_{ij}^2 \\ \theta_{ij}^3 \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{\theta_1} & \sigma_{\theta_{12}} & \sigma_{\theta_{13}} \\ \cdot & \sigma_{\theta_2} & \sigma_{\theta_{23}} \\ \cdot & \cdot & \sigma_{\theta_3} \end{bmatrix} \right) \quad (10)$$

The parameters of the distribution have interesting interpretations. For example if  $\sigma_{\psi_{12}}$  is positive, this means that unobserved workplace characteristics that are associated with more sick leaves are also associated with more other paid leaves.

This specification entails the estimation of 12 parameters for the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity components. In the results reported below, we

settle on a slightly less involved specification where we assume that

$$\psi_j^a = \tau^a \psi_j \tag{11}$$

$$\theta_{ij}^a = \kappa^a \theta_{ij} \tag{12}$$

$$\psi_j \sim N(0, 1) \tag{13}$$

$$\theta_{ij} \sim N(0, 1) \tag{14}$$

This last specification requires the estimation of 6 parameters ( $\tau^a, \kappa^a; a = 1, 2, 3$ ) and is a parametrization used by Heckman and Walker (1990) in a different context.

We use maximum likelihood methods to obtain estimates for the parameters, integrating out the two separate unobserved heterogeneity components. Since a closed form solution to the integral does not exist, the likelihood is computed by approximating the normal integral using a numerical integration algorithm based on Gauss-Hermite Quadrature. This algorithm selects a number of points and weights such that the weighted points approximate the normal distribution.

## 4 Data

We use data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2004 conducted by Statistics Canada. The survey is both longitudinal and linked in that it documents the characteristics of the workers and of the workplaces over time. The target population for the “workplace” component of the survey is defined as the collection of all Canadian establishments with paid employees in March of the year of the survey. The survey, however, does not cover the Yukon, the Northwest territories and Nunavut. Establishments operating in fisheries, agriculture and cattle farming are also excluded. For the “employee” component, the target population is the collection of all employees working, or on paid leave,

in the workplace target population.

The sample for the workplaces comes from the “Business registry” of Statistics Canada which contains information on every business operating in Canada. Employees are then sampled from an employees list provided by the selected workplaces. For every workplace, a maximum of twenty-four employees are selected, and for establishments with less than four employees, all employees are sampled. In the case of total non-response, respondents are withdrawn entirely from the survey and sampling weights are recalculated in order to preserve representativeness of the sample. WES selects new employees and workplaces in odd years (at every third year for employees and at every fifth year for workplaces).

Individuals who did not work throughout the year are also included but we control for their limited exposure to the risk of being absent in our regression framework. However, we drop workers who were absent more than thirty days of work in the past year.<sup>10</sup>

Each worker in the sample has been asked the number of days of sick paid leave, other paid leave and unpaid leave he took in the last year. In most case, other paid leave are mandated by law and include education leave, disability leave, bereavement, marriage, jury duty, and union business. Note that other paid leave does not include vacations, paternity/maternity leave or absence due to strikes or lock-out.

The rich structure of the data set allows us to control for a variety of factors determining absenteeism decisions. From the worker questionnaire, we are able to extract detailed demographic characteristics including measures of health, human capital, and income from other sources. Moreover, we use detailed explanatory variables on the employment contract including wage, contracted hours and information about working hours flexibility and when these working hours take place.

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<sup>10</sup>Results are robust to other cutoff points for eliminating outliers.

From the workplace questionnaire, we are able to construct firm size indicators and build measures of layoff and vacancy rates. Finally, our regressions include industry (13), occupation (6) and time (6) dummies. Summary statistics on all explanatory variables are presented in Table 1 for the dependent variable, Table 2 for the employees and Table 3 for the employers.

Column ‘All’ from Table 1 shows an average of 3.5 days of absence per employee per year or close to a full working week. This number is slightly lower than other published numbers because of the exclusion of long term absenteeism from the sample and the exclusion of employees from the public sector where absenteeism is higher. Not surprisingly, most absences take the form of sick paid leave representing 43% of all absences. However, more surprisingly, unpaid leave represents the second biggest contribution to total absences with 36% of all absences.

The other three columns present similar computations for the subsample of individuals who reported having at least one day of each type of absence. For example, conditional on having at least one day of paid sick leave, the average number of days of paid sick leave is 4.2 days. Quite interestingly, individuals with some paid sick leave or other paid leave are reporting having also more other paid leave and paid sick leave respectively than the average individuals while the opposite is true for individuals who took some unpaid leave. This is evidence that paid sick leave and other paid leave are substitutes either at the worker or workplace level.

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the same four different samples as Table 1. Comparing the last three columns to the first one allows us to identify the characteristics of individuals over represented among absents. For example, it seems that women are more likely to take any kind of leave but the effect is stronger for paid sick leave. Quite interestingly, it appears that some variables

are associated differently with unpaid leave than paid leave. Take seniority for example, where individuals with lower than average seniority are over represented among individuals with some unpaid leave and individual with higher than average seniority are over represented among individuals who took some paid sick leave or other paid leave. The contrast is particularly striking with respect to hourly wages and income from other sources (where lower than average earners are over-represented among individuals who took some unpaid leave).

Similarly, looking at summary statistics for employers, one can see that individuals from smaller firms are over represented among people with unpaid leave and individuals in bigger firms over represented among individuals who took some paid leave, whether for sickness or other reasons. This might be because paid leave is unavailable or severely limited to workers in smaller firms.

## 5 Results

Estimation results are presented in Table 4 where we contrast the determinants of sick leave, other paid leave and unpaid leave. In all models, the dependent variable is the total number of days of absence that is reported for the whole year.<sup>11</sup>

**Predictions of the theoretical model** In the first part of Table 4, we focus on the predictions of the theoretical model. The most important thing to note is that the coefficients for wages ( $w$ ), contracted hours ( $t^c$ ) and income ( $R$ ) on paid sick leave and other paid leave have the same sign, but is opposite of the sign for unpaid leave. Also note that, comparing the estimated coefficients for paid sick leave and other paid leave, the magnitude of the later is somewhat higher.

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<sup>11</sup>The structure of the data does not allow us to study episodes of absenteeism.



All results for unpaid leave are in line with the assumption that leisure is not an inferior good with one exception, the coefficient of contracted hours. It seems that the effect of this variable is not limited to a pure income effect.

The coefficient on hourly wages for unpaid leave implies an absence elasticity of about -0.37. This is a surprisingly similar elasticity to the one obtained by Allen (1981) although we use a completely different model and much better data. The implication is the same though: given the low elasticity, workplace who want to diminish absenteeism must rely on other mechanisms than wage increases. This elasticity is even positive for paid leaves. Overall the direct cost of absenteeism is much lower for paid absence than for unpaid absence.

Our two proxies for the average (indirect) cost of absenteeism are the workplace's layoff and vacancy rates.<sup>12</sup> The coefficient for the vacancy rate has the expected sign: the higher the vacancy rate, the higher the number of days of absence for all three types. For the layoff rate, we again observe different signs for paid and unpaid leave.

Comparing these results to Dionne and Dostie (2007) who focus on the determinants of total days of absence, it seems like their reported coefficients represent an average of the coefficients shown here. For example, their estimate of the impact of the wage rate is also negative but much closer to zero. Because of the many changes in sign for the determinants of paid and unpaid leave, this suggests that focusing on total absences will yield coefficients biased toward zero when some absences are paid and others unpaid.

**Demographics, health and human capital** We again note that many coefficients have different impact on paid and unpaid leave. This is the case for

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<sup>12</sup>In the literature, the cost of absenteeism is usually related to an increased likelihood of being fired or being passed up for promotion. Therefore, we settle on an indicator of the layoff rate (defined as the number of workers laid off in the past year divided by average employment) and the vacancy rate (defined as the number of positions available in the firm divided by average employment).

the stock of human capital of the employee: higher levels of education, seniority or experience are associated with higher numbers of days of paid leave and lower numbers of days of unpaid leave. The magnitude of the increase in the number of paid sick leave diminishes however for higher levels of education. It is even negative for individuals with some higher education. Given the lack of information in the data, it is hard to conclude to a causal impact of education on absenteeism. It is possible that individual with some higher education are sorting into jobs where no sick leave is available. It should be noted though that good health, as an unambiguous impact, decreasing all types of absence.

The impacts of demographic characteristics are even more ambiguous, explaining perhaps some contradictory results in the literature. For example, a women with no pre-school aged kids is more likely to take paid sick leave and unpaid leave but has less days of other paid leave. Adding pre-school aged kids increases both sick paid leave and other paid leave but decreases unpaid leave in the case of men and, surprisingly, decreases all three types of absence in the case of women. We interpret this as evidence that family responsibilities with respect to kids are more equally shared among parents than previously found.

**Work arrangement and firm size** Three workplace characteristics unambiguously raise all types of absence: the compressed workweek, working in shift and being covered by a collective bargaining agreement. One could have thought that workers being covered by a collective bargaining agreement would have access to more paid leave thus lowering the need for unpaid leave but the results show that while an unionized worker is 15% and 20% more likely to get one day of paid sick or other paid leave, he is also more than twice as likely (52%) to take one day of unpaid leave. This seems to indicate a lower indirect cost of absenteeism.

Finally, we observe that absences increase with firm size but unpaid leave is

more frequent in smaller workplace whereas other paid leave and especially sick paid leave is more likely to be observed in large workplaces.

**Unobserved heterogeneity** The estimated coefficients for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution are shown in the last panel of Table 4. Remember that  $\tau$  refers to unobserved workplace heterogeneity and  $\kappa$  to unobserved worker heterogeneity. At the worker level, since all  $\kappa$  are positive, this means that all types of absence are positively correlated: workers who take more paid sick leave also have more other paid leave and more unpaid leave. This indicates that there is probably a category of workers who are not very sensitive to the cost of absence.

However, at the workplace level, we observe a negative correlation between paid leave (sick or other) and unpaid leave. This means that workplaces with more paid sick leave also have more other paid leave but lower unpaid leave. Therefore, while summary statistics indicate that paid and unpaid leaves are substitutes, estimated correlations show that the substitutability is driven by the establishment leave policy and not by the worker.

## 6 Conclusion

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of absence, distinguishing between three different types of absence and using that information to get some measure of the direct cost of absence to the worker. This paper is one of the very few articles examining the determinants of absences with survey data and a precise measure of the cost of absence.

We find that many workplace, worker or job characteristics have differentiated impacts on paid and unpaid leave, something that has not been found before. Unpaid leave follows the usual patterns under the assumption that

leisure is not an inferior good (positive income effect and negative wage effect). These effects have opposite signs for paid leave which seems to indicate that the direct cost of absenteeism is lower for paid absences. Different effects are also obtained for the layoff rate used as one proxy for the indirect cost of absenteeism while the effect is identical for the other proxy, the vacancy rate. Using an empirical model suitable to linked employer-employee data with workplace and worker unobserved heterogeneity, we find that all three types of absence are positively correlated at the worker level but that paid and unpaid leave are negatively correlated at the workplace level.

Further work would benefit greatly to access to detailed contract information. For example, does the employee has access to any paid sick leave and if so how many days? Does the employee use unpaid leave only when paid leave is no longer available? Is the worker full compensated for sick leave or does he receive only a fraction of his wage?

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## 7 Appendix: Comparative statics of $t^u$ and $t^p$

From (4) and (5) we obtain the following second order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} E\left(U_{LL} + (w + \tilde{w}^u)^2 U_{CC} - 2(w + \tilde{w}^u) U_{CL}\right) &= H^{uu} < 0 \\ E\left(U_{LL} + (w(1-s) + \tilde{w}^p)^2 U_{CC} - 2(w(1-s) + \tilde{w}^p) U_{CL}\right) &= H^{pp} < 0 \\ E\left(U_{LL} + (w(1-s) + \tilde{w}^p)(w + \tilde{w}^u) U_{CC} - (\tilde{w}^u + \tilde{w}^p + w(2-s)) U_{CL}\right) &= H^{up} = H^{pu} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{vmatrix} H^{uu} & H^{up} \\ H^{pu} & H^{pp} \end{vmatrix} = H > 0.$$

To obtain comparative statics results with respect to  $w$ ,  $R$ ,  $t^c$  and  $E(w^i)$ , we must first take the total differentiation of the first order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} H^{uu} dt^u + H^{up} dt^p + H^{uw} dw + H^{uR} dR + H^{ut^c} dt^c + H^{uE(w^i)} dE(w^i) &= 0 \\ H^{pu} dt^u + H^{pp} dt^p + H^{pw} dw + H^{pR} dR + H^{pt^c} dt^c + H^{pE(w^i)} dE(w^i) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

from which we obtain the following results by applying the Cramer's rule and writing  $i, j = p, u$ ,  $j \neq i$ .

$$\frac{\partial t^i}{\partial R} = -\frac{H^{jj}}{H} E(U_{LC} - \tilde{w}^{it} U_{CC})$$

where

$$\tilde{w}^{pt} = w(1-s) + \tilde{w}^p$$

and

$$\tilde{w}^{ut} = w + \tilde{w}^u.$$

Assuming that leisure is not an inferior good under certainty,  $\frac{\partial t^u}{\partial R}$  is positive.

This positive sign may become less important or even negative when  $s$  is high or close to one and for  $E(w^p) \leq E(w^u)$  for a given  $U_{LC}$ .

In this model,  $t^c$  is considered as exogenous when the worker makes his decision about  $t^i$ . So the effect of  $\frac{\partial t^i}{\partial t^c}$  is given by the sign of:

$$-\frac{H^{jj}}{H} E(U_{LC} - \tilde{w}^{it} U_{CC}) w.$$

Now differentiating the first order conditions with respect to  $w$  yields for paid absence:

$$-\frac{H^{uu}}{H} E[-(1-s)U_C + (U_{LC} - \tilde{w}^{pt} U_{CC})(t^c - (1-s)t^p - t^u)]$$

which is negative under normal conditions of positive labor supply curve and when  $s = 0$ . When  $s$  is sufficiently high or equal to one (full paid benefits), the effect is positive when the income effect is positive. The effect becomes ambiguous for many values of  $s$  and is a subject matter for empirical investigation.

Finally, we may be interested to verify how an increase in the expected penalty may affect the  $t^i$  decisions. The sign of  $\frac{\partial t^i}{\partial E(w^i)}$  is the same as that of  $\frac{\partial t^i}{\partial w^i}$  under certainty and is equal to:

$$-\frac{H^{jj}}{H} E(-U_C - (U_{LC} - \tilde{w}^{it} U_{CC}) t^i)$$

and is negative under the assumption that  $L$  is not an inferior good but becomes ambiguous otherwise. One can also rewrite the above equation and obtain:

$$-\frac{H^{jj}}{H} E\left(-1 - \frac{(U_{LC} - \tilde{w}^{it} U_{CC})}{U_C} t^i\right) U_C.$$

So we obtain the same result if proportional risk aversion is uniformly less than unity. This result is not without link with the sufficient condition for having a



reduction in the optimal risk exposure following a first order deterioration in the random variable. It should be note, however, that a first-order deterioration in the random variable implies a decrease in its expected value while the contrary is not necessarily true (Gollier and Eeckhoudt (2000)).

Table 1: Summary statistics on days of absence 1999-2004

Days of absence	All		Sick		Other paid		Unpaid	
	Mean	Std Dev.	Mean	Std Dev.	Mean	Std Dev.	Mean	Std Dev.
Sick leave	1.536	0.016	4.214	0.005	2.371	0.044	1.230	0.024
Other paid leave	0.729	0.010	1.055	0.019	4.414	0.052	0.556	0.019
Unpaid leave	1.291	0.016	0.749	0.006	0.843	0.023	6.651	0.010
#Observations	109,289		42,568		19,920		18,646	

Table 2: Summary statistics - Employee

	All	Sick	Other	Unpaid
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>				
Women	0.518	0.589	0.535	0.546
Black	0.012	0.011	0.012	0.012
Other race	0.301	0.308	0.273	0.274
Married	0.559	0.584	0.61	0.471
Number of pre-school aged kids	0.238	0.255	0.238	0.23
<i>Health</i>				
No activity limitation	0.611	0.586	0.581	0.603
<i>Human Capital</i>				
High school degree	0.171	0.141	0.139	0.179
Certificate	0.137	0.119	0.14	0.159
Less than bachelor degree	0.397	0.434	0.412	0.409
Bachelor degree	0.13	0.171	0.159	0.09
Some higher education	0.059	0.075	0.079	0.03
Seniority	8.809	9.897	10.051	6.957
Experience	17.023	17.663	18.194	14.187
<i>Income</i>				
Income from other sources (000s)	2.401	2.671	2.538	2.06
<i>Wage Contract</i>				
Natural logarithm of hourly wage	2.841	2.973	2.981	2.664
Contracted hours	36.554	37.626	37.738	34.857
<i>Work arrangement</i>				
Works regular hours	0.117	0.06	0.081	0.151
Usual workweek includes Sat. and Sun.	0.206	0.125	0.147	0.285
Work flexible hours	0.366	0.331	0.346	0.346
Does not work MtoF between 6am & 6pm	0.613	0.723	0.694	0.488
Some work done at home	0.245	0.294	0.304	0.13
Work some rotating shift	0.069	0.07	0.085	0.082
Work on a reduced workweek	0.068	0.043	0.052	0.105
Work on compressed work week schedule	0.053	0.047	0.058	0.063
Covered by a CBA	0.257	0.327	0.349	0.301

Table 3: Summary statistics - Workplace

	All	Sick	Other	Unpaid
<i>Cost of absenteeism <math>E(w^a)</math></i>				
Vacancy rate	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.019
Layoff rate	0.083	0.064	0.066	0.090
<i>Size</i>				
20-99 employees	0.309	0.289	0.278	0.338
100-499 employees	0.204	0.246	0.255	0.207
500 employees and more	0.165	0.235	0.229	0.136
#Observations	109,289	42,568	19,920	18,646

Table 4: Simultaneous Poisson regressions on days of absence

	Sick	Other paid	Unpaid
<i>Variables from the theoretical model</i>			
Natural log. of hourly wage ( $w$ )	0.056 *** (0.004)	0.148 *** (0.005)	-0.366 *** (0.005)
Contracted hours ( $t^c$ )	0.016 *** (0.000)	0.021 *** (0.000)	-0.006 *** (0.000)
Income from other sources (000s) ( $R$ )	-0.002 *** (0.000)	-0.001 *** (0.000)	0.002 *** (0.000)
<i>Cost of absenteeism (<math>E(w^a)</math>)</i>			
Layoff Rate	-0.012 *** (0.002)	-0.022 *** (0.002)	0.004 ** (0.002)
Vacancy Rate	0.075 *** (0.024)	0.241 *** (0.036)	0.219 *** (0.028)

Statistical significance: \*=10%; \*\*=5%; \*\*\*=1%.

Robust standard error in parantheses

Table 4: Cont'd

	Sick	Other paid	Unpaid
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>			
Women	0.251 *** (0.004)	-0.030 *** (0.005)	0.065 *** (0.006)
Black	0.012 (0.013)	-0.046 ** (0.020)	-0.007 (0.023)
Other race	0.028 *** (0.003)	-0.103 *** (0.005)	-0.096 *** (0.005)
Married	-0.091 *** (0.003)	0.022 *** (0.004)	-0.010 ** (0.005)
Number of pre-school aged kids	0.068 *** (0.003)	0.014 *** (0.004)	-0.010 ** (0.004)
Women * pre-school aged kids	-0.016 *** (0.005)	-0.172 *** (0.007)	-0.093 *** (0.007)
<i>Health</i>			
No activity limitation	-0.365 *** (0.005)	-0.102 *** (0.007)	-0.265 *** (0.006)
<i>Human Capital</i>			
High school degree	0.043 *** (0.006)	0.185 *** (0.008)	-0.035 *** (0.008)
Certificate	0.074 *** (0.005)	0.250 *** (0.007)	0.136 *** (0.009)
Less than bachelor degree	0.102 *** (0.005)	0.209 *** (0.007)	0.023 *** (0.008)
Bachelor degree	0.015 ** (0.007)	0.039 *** (0.009)	-0.204 *** (0.011)
Some higher education	-0.190 *** (0.008)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.289 *** (0.014)
Seniority	0.047 *** (0.001)	0.034 *** (0.001)	-0.027 *** (0.001)
Seniority squared (/100)	-0.129 *** (0.002)	-0.098 *** (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)
Experience	0.006 *** (0.000)	0.015 *** (0.001)	-0.031 *** (0.001)
Experience squared (/100)	-0.019 *** (0.001)	-0.045 *** (0.002)	0.032 *** (0.002)

Statistical significance: \*=10%; \*\*=5%; \*\*\*=1%.

Robust standard error in parantheses

Table 4: Cont'd

	Sick	Other paid	Unpaid
<i>Work arrangement</i>			
Work regular hours	-0.337 *** (0.004)	-0.203 *** (0.005)	0.197 *** (0.004)
Work on weekend	-0.110 *** (0.004)	-0.118 *** (0.005)	0.011 ** (0.005)
Work flexible hours	-0.056 *** (0.003)	0.018 *** (0.003)	0.083 *** (0.003)
Work non traditional working hours	0.178 *** (0.004)	0.154 *** (0.005)	-0.133 *** (0.005)
Work at home	-0.025 *** (0.003)	0.176 *** (0.004)	-0.227 *** (0.005)
Work in shift	0.220 *** (0.005)	0.204 *** (0.006)	0.011 * (0.007)
Work on a reduced workweek	-0.150 *** (0.006)	-0.162 *** (0.007)	0.216 *** (0.006)
Work on compressed workweek	0.075 *** (0.005)	0.136 *** (0.006)	0.028 *** (0.006)
Covered by a CBA	0.151 *** (0.003)	0.207 *** (0.005)	0.520 *** (0.005)
<i>Firm Size</i>			
20-99 employees	0.324 *** (0.005)	0.230 *** (0.006)	0.137 *** (0.006)
100-499 employees	0.519 *** (0.006)	0.351 *** (0.007)	0.046 *** (0.007)
500 employees and more	0.647 *** (0.007)	0.415 *** (0.008)	-0.074 *** (0.009)
<i>Constant and unobserved heterogeneity parameters</i>			
Constant	-2.169 *** (0.022)	-3.772 *** (0.026)	-0.638 *** (0.028)
$\tau$	0.556 *** (0.002)	0.348 *** (0.003)	-0.842 *** (0.002)
$\kappa$	0.688 *** (0.001)	1.230 *** (0.002)	1.749 *** (0.003)
Industry dummies	YES	YES	YES
Occupation dummies	YES	YES	YES
Year dummies	YES	YES	YES
ln-likelihood		-529,420.07	
#observations		109,289	

Statistical significance: \*=10%; \*\*=5%; \*\*\*=1%.

Robust standard error in parantheses